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PRESENTATION
Many have turned to a virtue-theoretic approach in epistemology
because of the number of issues that have plague epistemology over the
past few decades. The Gettier problem, the controversy between founda-
tionalism and coherentism, and the dispute between internalism and exter-
nalism, among others, have led to the emergence of Virtue Epistemology.
The proposal of developing a virtue approach to epistemology was first
suggested by Ernest Sosa in his article entitled «The Raft and the Pyramid».
The idea came to him due to the epistemological issues at the time, partic-
ularly, the dispute between foundationalism and coherentism. He believed
that an epistemology-based-virtue could bypass the dispute between these
two opposing theories. After Sosa’s initial proposal, other philosophers
followed and began to develop a virtue-theoretic approach to epistemolo-
gy, which came to be known as Virtue Epistemology.
The application of a virtue approach to epistemology was somehow
influenced by the revival of a virtue theory in ethics due to the dissatisfaction
towards deontological ethics and consequentialism. Sosa thinks that the
same strategy may prove fruitful in epistemology. In other words, if moral
virtues have proven useful in ethics then intellectual virtues may also prove
valuable in epistemology. Ernest Sosa, on his part, tried to address those
epistemological problems by resorting to his theory of Virtue Perspectivism.
He claims that his theory can handle the debate between foundationalism
and coherentism and the controversy between internalism and externalism.
He argues that these uncompromising theories are false dichotomies. Thus,
Resumen. El «perspectivismo de la virtud» de Sosa
incorpora elementos positivos del fundacionalismo,
del coherentismo y del confiabilismo. Se estudian
dos nociones claves: la virtud intelectual y la per-
spectiva epistémico, para proveer un análisis de la
justificación y del conocimiento. Se desarrolla un
análisis de la noción de virtud intelectual. Se exami-
na la distinción entre conocimiento acertado y justifi-
cación, y, finalmente, se considera la distinción entre
el conocimiento animal y el conocimiento reflexivo.
Se defiende la necesidad de distinguir la virtud int-
electual de las facultades cognoscitivas y de las vir-
tudes morales. De este modo, se intenta integrar en el
concepto de virtud intelectual los elementos posi-
tivos del confiabilismo y del responsabilismo de la
virtud. El conocimiento requiere la evaluación del
cognoscente. Por tanto, la tesis desarrolla una «nueva
aproximación» al conocimiento, que puede llamarse
«responsabilismo de las facultades».
Palabras clave: Conocimiento, Justificación, Virtud,
Confiabilisimo, Responsabilismo.
Abstract. Sosa’s Theory of Virtue Perspectivism in-
corporates the positive insights of foundationalism,
coherentism, and reliabilism. It focuses on two key
notions: the notion of intellectual virtues and the no-
tion of epistemic perspectivism. Thus, Virtue Perspec-
tivism provides an analysis of justification and
knowledge. The thesis will provide an in-depth analy-
sis of Sosa`s distinction of aptness and justification
and finally, it shall consider Sosa’s distinction of ani-
mal and reflective knowledge. We shall argue that we
need to distinguish intellectual virtue from cognitive
faculties and from moral virtues. In so doing, we inte-
grate the positive insight of Virtue Reliabilism and
Virtue Responsibilism. Human knowledge requires
the evaluation of the knower since it is not possible to
speak of human knowledge in isolation of the subject
who does the knowing. Hence, the thesis will expli-
cate a «new approach» to human knowledge, to
which we might refer to as Faculty Responsibilism.
Key words: Knowledge, Justification, Virtue, Relia-
bilism, Responsabilism.
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Sosa’s theory incorporates the positive insights of foundationalism, coheren-
tism and reliabilism. In short, VP takes on board both the positive insights of
internalism and externalism. In the final analysis, we can see that the intent
of Sosa is to provide an adequate account of justification and knowledge.
Sosa’s VP, as the name of his theory implies, focuses on two key no-
tions: the notion of intellectual virtues and the notion of epistemic perspec-
tivism. His epistemology can be described as an «epistemology-based-
virtues». Hence, Sosa tries to develop a kind of epistemology in which he
provides an analysis of justification and knowledge in terms of intellectual
virtue with an emphasis on the agent’s epistemic perspectivism. First, Sosa
evaluates the epistemic status of beliefs in terms of the epistemic properties
of the subject. In so doing, beliefs must be acquired through the exercise of
one’s intellectual virtue or faculty. Second, he makes a distinction between
an apt belief and a justified belief. An apt belief is simply a product of one’s
intellectual virtue while a justified belief requires that such belief be placed
within the epistemic perspective of the subject. Lastly, Sosa distinguishes
between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge for which the role of
epistemic perspectivism becomes even more apparent.
In our discussion, we shall examine Sosa’s account of justification
and knowledge to see whether or not his theory can respond satisfactorily
to those epistemological problems we mentioned earlier as regards the
question of the structure and nature of justification and knowledge. In the
final analysis, we shall evaluate Sosa’s VP in order to see if he does pro-
vide an adequate explication of justification and knowledge. Of course, we
shall end our discussion with our own proposed account of justification
and knowledge. Hence, the discussion that will follow was drawn from
Part III of my doctoral dissertation on Ernest Sosa entitled «The New Ap-
proach to Human Knowledge in Sosa’s Virtue Perspectivism».
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JUSTIFICATION AND KNOWLEDGE
Epistemic justification may be considered as an ambiguous term.
There is a lack of unanimity concerning its notion given that there is no
single and generally accepted understanding of epistemic justification.
Each one employs this term to accommodate one’s epistemological con-
cerns. Perhaps, this is simply a consequence of its broad scope; that is, the
concept of justification has many applications1. Nevertheless, we can say
that all share a «thin» concept of justification2 and that all agree that epis-
temic justification is important in our understanding of knowledge. Unde-
niably, we prefer our beliefs to be justified than to be unjustified. In our
discussion, we shall focus our attention on Sosa’s account of justification.
We will consider his conditions for the justification of beliefs. We will ex-
amine Sosa’s distinction of aptness and justification, his view on epistemic
perspectivism, and how he tries to provide solutions to the problems en-
countered by reliabilism. We will end the first section with a proposed ac-
count of justification, an attempt to provide suggestions to improve Sosa’s
account of justification.
In the second section, we shall focus our attention on Sosa’s ac-
count of knowledge. We shall consider the conditions for knowledge pro-
posed by Sosa. We shall then try to understand his distinction of animal
knowledge and reflective knowledge and to see the viability of such a dis-
tinction. Finally, we shall end our discussion with our proposed account of
knowledge in which we shall try to integrate the positive insights of Sosa’s
account and Zagzebski’s account into our distinction of unreflective and
reflective knowledge.
1. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Justification», p. 457.
2. The idea of the «thin» concept of justification was suggested by Battaly. Cfr. H.
BATTALY, «Thin Concepts to the Rescue», pp. 106-109.
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1. EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
Our main question in this section is «How do beliefs get to be justi-
fied?» It was argued that for a belief to constitute as knowledge, it must be
nonaccidentally true. In Sosa’s account of justification, «what we can view
as justified or unjustified is what we can relate appropriately to someone’s
faculties»3. In other words, we will consider the subject who justifies the
belief since it is he who justifies a certain belief as to why he believes what
he believes and how he arrives at believing what he believes. Sosa empha-
sizes the importance of the knowing subject as the seat of justification4.
Sosa describes justification as being somewhat analogous to the
sport of archery (or any other sports mutatis mutandis). In the sport of
archery, the aim is to hit the bullseye or at least to hit it as close as possible.
To do this, the archer must be skillful enough so that he can hit the bullseye
with a high ratio of success. Of course, the success rate will be in propor-
tion to the skill of the archer. This does not exclude the possibility that the
archer may hit the bullseye with a minimal skill, but in such case, we may
say that he is just lucky. No doubt, there is a difference between hitting the
bullseye through skill and hitting it through luck. The former will certainly
be more satisfying and rewarding than the latter. Epistemic justification5,
like a skill, facilitates us to achieve our cognitive aim, which is to acquire
truth and avoid falsehood. The idea of the sport of archery underlines the
normative character of justification. Based on this, Sosa affirms that
«knowledge is not just hitting the mark but hitting the mark somehow
through means proper and skillful enough»6. Thus, we can draw two ideas
involved in the concept of justification: its normative character and its con-
nection to truth7.
Sosa defines epistemic justification as follows:
«Epistemic justification is a normative or evaluative property that shares
with such properties generally three important features. It is supervenient.
Its attribution is universalizable. And it is governed by principles. It is su-
pervenient because whenever it applies to a belief (or the like), there must
be more basic properties of that belief such that any belief with such proper-
ties would be equally epistemically justified. Its attribution is universaliz-
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3. E. SOSA, «Justification», p. 457.
4. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles», p. 278.
5. In our consideration of knowledge, only «epistemic» (or theoretical) justification
will be relevant in whether or not one knows that p. Thus, practical justification or
moral and religious convictions are not considered in our account of justification. Cfr.
KIP, p. 86.
6. L. BONJOUR and E. SOSA, Epistemic Justification, p. 105.
7. Cfr. R. AUDI, «Justification, Truth, and Reliability», Philosophy and Phenome-
nological Research, 49 (1988) 1-29.
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able because if a belief is epistemically justified, then any belief similar to
that belief in all relevant respects would be equally epistemically justified.
And it is governed by principles because the epistemic justification of a be-
lief must always derive from certain intrinsic or relational properties of it, so
that any belief just like it in respect of all such properties must be equally
well justified. A principle is thus implied, one that governs epistemic justifi-
cation by making it consequent on antecedent properties of belief»8.
According to Sosa, the first project of epistemology is to come up
with an account of the conditions for the justification of beliefs. We need to
find an account of the conditions that S needs to satisfy to know that p is
true. This is the project of understanding. The second project of epistemol-
ogy –project of validation– is just the consequence of the first project. It
evaluates whether or not the conditions for the justification of beliefs are
satisfied. This may involve changing our situation with respect to the
proposition in question so as to meet the conditions established. Its task is
to ensure that our supposed knowledge can be considered as real knowl-
edge9. The all-important question now is, «What are the conditions for the
justification of beliefs?»
1.1. The Conditions for Justification
The task at hand is to find an adequate account of epistemic justifi-
cation. What we need is to look for features which are each necessary and
jointly sufficient to justify a belief. As we have seen earlier, there is a dis-
agreement regarding the necessary conditions of justification although all
agree that there must be some conditions which must be satisfied to have a
justified belief10. Some suggest an account that is purely internal and oth-
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8. KIP, pp. 86-87.
9. «The Project of Understanding is that of finding as simple, general and convinc-
ing an account as we are able to find of the conditions within which our belief of a
proposition has the kind of epistemic authority (justification, evidence, warrant) re-
quired for one to know its truth. Having completed the Project of Understanding to his
full satisfaction... He may thus be brought to face a Project of Validation, of so changing
the situation with regard to more and more of the propositions that we commonly take
ourselves to know that he may come to satisfy the conditions necessary for knowledge
by his own (earlier) account.» KIP, pp. 87-88.
10. Alston writes, «...we must clear out of the way a confusion between one’s being
justified in believing that p, and one’s justifying one’s belief that p, where the latter involves
one’s doing something to show that p, or to show that one’s belief was justified, or exhibit
one’s justification. The first side of this distinction is a state or condition one is in, not any-
thing one does or any upshot thereof. I might be justified in believing that there is milk on
the table because I see it there, even though I have done nothing to show that there is milk
on the table or to show that I am justified in believing there to be. It is amazing how often
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ers opt for an account that is purely external. Of course, such views are
based on their supposed sources of justification. The knowing subject who
justifies the belief must have a source from which he obtains his reason/s
for believing that p. Sosa writes:
«What sorts of conditions can make us thus justified in so believing? It
is useful to distinguish next among three things:
B The subject’s beliefs
E The subject’s sensory experiences
W The world external to the subject’s psychology
(All for a given subject S at a time t)»11
As indicated above, these sources of justification reflect the views
of coherentism, foundationalism and reliabilism. Sosa sees these three
main options as ways to view epistemic justification12. Can any of these
views provide us with an adequate account of justification?13
Sosa highlights two problems with foundationalism. First is the
idea that our visual beliefs are said to be justified based on our visual expe-
rience. If justification of visual beliefs is based on our visual experience,
then are we supposed to understand this as a fundamental principle or as a
derived generalization? If we are to accept the former, then we will have
the problem of having a multitude of principles with no unifying ground.
We need to concern ourselves with beliefs grounded on our vision, our
hearing, etc., without any possibility of uniting them. Likewise, if we are
to accept the latter, then it will require more explication concerning the
question of fundamental principle14. Second, foundationalism admits that
knowledge must have a foundation. The rationalist admits that the founda-
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these matters are confused in the literature. We will be concentrating on the “be justified”
side of this distinction, since that is of more fundamental epistemological interest. If epis-
temic justification were restricted to those cases in which the subject carries out “justifica-
tion”, it would obviously not be a necessary condition of knowledge or even of being in a
strong position to acquire knowledge. Most cases of perception knowledge, for example,
involve no such activity». W. ALSTON, Epistemic Justification, pp. 82-83. In the abovemen-
tioned, what Alston is saying is that to require S to «show» that he is justified in his believ-
ing is too strong for epistemic justification. If we admit such condition, we will have very
«few» beliefs that we may consider justified. It will suffice to mention the case of children
and unsophisticated adults to see that such requirement for justification is indeed too strong.
11. L. BONJOUR and E. SOSA, Epistemic Justification, p. 107.
12. «It is fair to say that Sosa sees three broad options available in epistemology –
not in the sense that these are the only ones logically possible, but in the sense that these
are the ones deemed most plausible by those, past and present, who have thought care-
fully about relevant matters». J. GRECO, «Introduction», p. xv.
13. See Part I, Section 2 and 3. We will examine these views briefly in direct rela-
tion to our discussion of epistemic justification and we will see its inadequacy for pro-
viding an account of epistemic justification.
14. KIP, p. 187.
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tion of knowledge must rest on rational intuition and deduction. The em-
piricist admits a much broader source of justification which includes also
sensory experience and induction. However, in spite of having a broader
foundation for knowledge, these sources of justification prove to be unreli-
able since it is possible to obtain beliefs from these sources that are not in-
stances of knowledge. The problem is how are we to distinguish beliefs de-
riving from such foundations that constitute as real knowledge from those
that are not?15 Sosa claims that there is a way to overcome the problems of
foundationalism. Intellectual virtue, according to Sosa, will provide a uni-
fying ground to the foundationalist’s epistemic principles regarding per-
ceptual beliefs. Hence, we can consider intuition, deduction, introspection,
etc. as intellectual virtues since all of these are abilities that lead the sub-
ject to attain true beliefs. Defining epistemic justification in terms of intel-
lectual virtues provides a unifying account of all the sources admitted by
foundationalism16. As regards the second problem, Sosa thinks that what
the subject needs is a certain intellectual virtue so as to be able to distin-
guish even complex matter (dodecagon) by simple inspection17.
Coherentism, Sosa argues, is also unacceptable. Epistemic justifica-
tion cannot be reduced to a mere coherence. Even a comprehensive and co-
herent set of beliefs is not enough to induce epistemic justification. It
seems wrong to admit that a true belief is justified if such belief coheres
within a system of beliefs but is totally detaches from one’s sensory expe-
rience. Take, for instance, the beliefs of a victim of an evil-demon, surely
we would not say that he is justified in his beliefs based on relations of co-
herence among beliefs only?18 Sosa maintains that comprehensive coher-
A NEW APPROACH TO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IN SOSA’S VIRTUE... 131
15. Cfr. KIP, pp. 1-3. «Foundational empiricism postulates three ways for a belief to
constitute foundational knowledge: rational intuition, introspection of one’s own experience,
and direct observation of one’s environment. For rational intuition there is the problem that
one can be right in accepting some necessary truth although one is only guessing – which
means, of course, that one does not know... neither introspection nor observation is always a
trustworthy source of fundamental knowledge... a belief can be introspective or observation-
al without constituting knowledge or a foundation for further knowledge. Once more the
foundationalist needs to explain the difference between, on one the hand, introspective or
observational beliefs that constitute knowledge and, on the other, beliefs that are not knowl-
edge despite being introspective or observational». E. SOSA, «Introduction», p. xvii.
16. Cfr. J. GRECO, «Virtues in Epistemology», p. 290.
17. Cfr. KIP, p. 9.
18. Cfr. KIP, pp. 157-158. «The New Evil Demon problem establishes this as fol-
lows. Consider the victim of Descartes’s evil demon. In fact, suppose we are now such
victims. Could that affect whether or not we are epistemically justified in believing what
we believe? If we are justified as we are, we would seem to be equally justified, in some
appropriate sense, so long as nothing changed within our whole framework of experi-
ences and beliefs. However, if by sheer luck one happened to be right in the belief that
one faces a fire, one’s being both thus justified and right still would fall short of one’s
knowing about the fire». E. SOSA, «Introduction», p. xv.
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ence is not enough to explain fully why a true belief is justified. He sug-
gests that «coherentism is hence well advised to adopt corresponding re-
quirements of (1) comprehensiveness, (2) perspectival content, and (3)
mesh with experience»19. In so doing, both coherentism and foundational-
ism score points since we will have a comprehensive (and perspectival)
coherence that is complemented with foundational beliefs. This improve-
ment provides a complete account of internal justification. However, we
still have yet to consider the external justification to complete fully our ac-
count of epistemic justification. Hence, let us now focus our attention on
reliabilism.
Sosa admits that reliabilism has an advantage over internalism be-
cause a knower is not required to have reasons for believing. It is enough
to justify a belief as long as it is a product of one’s reliable cognitive
process. Hence, reliabilism explains that one can be justified in believing
that p without reasoning from prior beliefs20. Despite the apparent advan-
tage of reliabilism, the necessity and sufficiency of the reliability of the
cognitive process in the justification of beliefs is questionable as seen in
our discussion of the evil-demon problem and the meta-incoherence prob-
lem. There seems to be a deficiency in generic reliabilism because it leaves
out the internal aspect required for the justification of beliefs. Sosa points
out that true belief must derive from an intellectual virtue instead of cogni-
tive process. In so doing, we put emphasis on the knowing subject and his
cognitive faculties21. Reliabilism does not adequately explain how beliefs
are justified. Thus, Sosa suggests the need of an «epistemic perspective» in
the justification of beliefs. BonJour affirms that «part of the motivation for
the requirement of an epistemic perspective is the idea that mere external
reliability, relying on one’s “animal aptitude” [KIP 282] is insufficient for
a fully brand of cognition»22. Sosa appears to be right for admitting that a
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19. L. BONJOUR and E. SOSA, Epistemic Justification, p. 112. To clarify, Sosa de-
scribes what kind of comprehensiveness is required. «Two sorts of requirements come
to mind... First we might require that the relevant beliefs of the subject be coherent
with each other and also coherent with that subject’s relevant experiences... And, sec-
ondly, perhaps the relevant beliefs should include some account of how the subject ac-
quires various other beliefs: thus the subject might know that there is at the time some-
thing white and round before him in part because he has some connection of how that
belief is owed to his good-enough faculty of vision». E. SOSA, «Virtue Perspectivism»,
p. 46.
20. Sosa comments that Unger, Goldman and Nozick «each offers a way to explain
how one can know that p without reasoning from prior knowledge. The key idea ex-
ploited here is this: you can know something noninferentially so long as it is no accident
or coincidence that you are right». E. SOSA, «Reflective Knowledge in the Best Cir-
cles», p. 278.
21. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Introduction», p. xxii.
22. L. BONJOUR, «Sosa’s Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness», G. AXTELL (ed.),
Knowledge, Belief, and Character, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland 2000, p. 93.
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belief must fit coherently within the epistemic perspective of the knowing
subject23. He argues:
«...there is... an immense variety of animal knowledge, instinctive or
learned, which facilitates survival and flourishing in an astonishingly rich
diversity of modes and environments. Human knowledge is on a higher
plane of sophistication, however, precisely because of its enhanced coher-
ence and comprehensiveness and its capacity to satisfy self-reflective cu-
riosity. Pure reliabilism is questionable as an adequate epistemology for
such knowledge»24.
It seems correct to affirm that there is a huge difference between
«animal» knowledge and «human» knowledge. Our «rational nature» is
what puts us on a higher level than animals. In such a case, would this not
imply that our justification for our beliefs should also be on a higher level,
and should not be compared to the level of «animals»? Can we be content
with a kind of justification that reliabilism is suggesting? We are yet to see
whether Sosa’s account is acceptable but at this point, we can admit that he
is in the right direction.
Having considered the views of foundationalism, coherentism and
reliabilism, they show that our only alternative is to wed the positive in-
sights of internalism and externalism. This is precisely what Sosa does in
his VP. He builds his VP «from Cartesianism through modest foundation-
alism, coherence theory, and reliabilism»25. He builds his account of justi-
fication in terms of intellectual virtues and epistemic perspectivism. Of
course, more is needed to explicate adequately Sosa’s view of epistemic
justification as we will seek to do in our next discussion.
1.2. Sosa’s Account of Epistemic Justification
A common usage of «justification» implies that to justify a certain
belief is to provide argumentative reasons in favor of it. Perhaps, we may
say that all epistemic justification is «argumentative» justification26. A lit-
tle probing will show however that argumentative justification is problem-
atic. In fact, this is one of the objections to foundationalism, which Sosa
calls the «argumentative account of justification». He considers such an
account in a twofold way: first, for a belief to be justified is for the subject
to justify it or to have justified it, and second, for one to justify a belief is
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23. Cfr. KIP, pp. 144-145.
24. KIP, p. 95.
25. W. ALSTON, «Knowledge in Perspective», p. 200.
26. Cfr. KIP, p. 111.
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for one correctly and seriously to use considerations or reasons in its fa-
vor27. A threat of vicious circularity lurks. If S must correctly use reasons
to justify a belief, then S needs to have justified reasons in its favor, and
this, in turn, will require justification. Hence, we face a threat of infinite
regress. «If a belief is knowledge only by being justified, and if being jus-
tified requires being based on further justified reasons, then there will be
no end to the process of justifying»28. The question now is how to deal with
the threat of infinite regress. Coherentism abandons the argumentative jus-
tification and suggests that justification must end in coherence. All that is
required to justify a belief is that it coheres within the knower’s set of be-
liefs. Foundationalism maintains that justification must be in terms of non-
inferential foundational beliefs. The «problem for foundationalism is to
explain how some knowledge can be self-standing [and the] problem for
coherentism is to explain how some circles can be virtuous»29.
To look for an alternative source of justification that is not argu-
mentative, Sosa suggests the doctrine of supervenience. It is a thesis that
maintains that evaluative properties must supervene on non-evaluative
properties. Thus, Sosa claims that epistemic justification is supervenient.
«The doctrine of supervenience for an evaluative property is simply
that, for every x, if x has φ then there is a non-evaluative property (perhaps
a relational property) Y such that (i) x has Y, and (ii) necessarily, whatever
has Y has φ»30.
It means that a thing will have its evaluative properties in virtue of
its non-evaluative properties. Let us consider the case of a good car. We
say that a car is good because of some other properties that it has such as
its reliability, its look, its acceleration, its comfort, etc. As such, we can say
that any car that has those properties is a good car. The same reasoning
holds true for epistemically evaluative properties. Hence, «if a belief is
cognitively justified, it is so presumably in virtue of non-evaluative prop-
erties... And any other belief just like it in respect of all such properties
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27. Cfr. KIP, p. 253.
28. J. GRECO, «Introduction», p. xvii. «Intellectualist Model of Justification, ac-
cording to which no belief is ever justified simply by being an accurate reflection in a
mirror so constituted as to be generally accurate in such reflections. A further meta-be-
lief is always required: that there is the belief in question (and that it is of a reliable
sort). Only such meta-belief makes possible sufficient justification for a particular ob-
servation or memory belief. But such introspection meta-belief must then fulfill the
same requirement... Hence there must be a meta-meta-belief, and we are off on a regress
inexorably vicious to particular justified belief by any finite mind». KIP, p. 195.
29. J. GRECO, «Sosa, Ernest (1940-)», p. 2288.
30. Cfr. KIP, p. 153 (Chapter 9 of KIP was drawn from E. SOSA, «The Foundations
of Foundationalism», Nous, 14 (1980) 547-565).
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could not fail to be equally well justified»31. Such source of epistemic justi-
fication would be «deriving from perception, introspection, or memory, or
deriving from a reliable faculty of one’s own. No reason has yet been pro-
vided to show that there can be no such foundational source of epistemic
justification»32. The doctrine of supervenience preserves the insight of
foundationalism in the sense that a justified belief is founded on non-epis-
temic properties such as perception, memory, etc.33.
Greco comments that the doctrine of supervenience provides insight
into the nature of justification and knowledge since the argumentative ac-
count of justification fails to explain the nature of the epistemically evalua-
tive properties. Likewise, considerations of supervenience also provide new
light concerning the dispute between internalism and externalism on epis-
temic justification. Internalism claims that justification of beliefs is based
entirely on factors that are «internal» to the knowing subject34. But, an inter-
nalist justification alone is not enough. We need a further requirement that
will explain the causal connection between our belief and the truth of our
belief and this can be done through Sosa’s intellectual virtue. Sosa argues
that knowledge requires both internal and external justification35. Hence, we
say that justification supervenes on one’s cognitive faculties.
As we shall see later, Sosa describes animal justification as belief
arising from a reliable cognitive faculty. With this view, Sosa integrates
nicely the insights of foundationalism since not all reliable sources involve
inference from other beliefs such as perception and introspection. Further-
more, for requiring epistemic perspective on the reliable source for reflec-
tive justification, Sosa incorporates the insights of coherentism in his ac-
count36. The «perspectivism is presented as Sosa’s form of coherentism (KIP
p. 97). “Pure” reliabilism is rejected in favor of an account with mixed re-
liabilist and coherentist elements, for each contains insights that need to be
integrated in an account of justification»37. This provides us an account of
Sosa’s conditions for epistemic justification. Thus, we say that what en-
ables S to justify his beliefs is as follows:
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31. KIP, p. 192. With the doctrine of supervenience, Sosa shows that the argumen-
tative account of justification cannot possibly serve as a source of epistemic justifica-
tion. It fails to go beyond the epistemically evaluative because to correctly use reasons
to justify a belief is to reason in its favor in terms of some epistemically evaluative prop-
erties. Sosa writes, «For the property of a belief of its having been supported by argu-
ment from something already believed with justification is not a non-epistemic property,
since it talks of justification, epistemic justification, already attained». KIP, p. 111.
32. KIP, p. 120.
33. Cfr. KIP, pp. 179-180.
34. Cfr. J. GRECO, «Introduction», pp. xviii-xix.
35. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles», p. 284.
36. Cfr. J. GRECO, «Sosa, Ernest (1940-)», p. 2289.
37. G. AXTELL, «Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology», p. 6.
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«They are presumably power or abilities to distinguished true from the
false in a certain subject field, to attain truth and avoid error in that field.
One’s power or ability must presumably make one such, normally at least,
in one’s ordinary habitat, or at least in one’s ordinary circumstances when
making such judgments, one would believe what is true and not believe
what is false, concerning matters in that field»38.
According to Sosa, a cognitive faculty or an intellectual virtue is
«the fundamental basis for the positive epistemic status of a belief»39. As
stated, cognitive faculties will work properly if given the appropriate envi-
ronment E. As such, we may consider two levels of epistemic justification.
First, we have the justification of beliefs of S in relation to certain intellec-
tual virtues of S and second, we have the justification of these cognitive
faculties as effective and virtuous cognitive faculties in relation to environ-
ment E40. Sosa writes:
«Epistemic justification of a belief B at a time t may thus require the
production of B at t through a virtue V resident in that subject... The epis-
temic quality of that belief will depend, moreover, at least in part, on the
epistemic quality of the operative virtue, on its degree of reliability in nor-
mal circumstances»41.
Sosa’s proposed account of epistemic justification will then have
two parts: first, is the requirement of the reliability of cognitive faculties
and second, is the requirement of epistemic perspectivism.
1.2.1. Aptness and Justification
As we have already mentioned, the problem with the argumentative
account of justification is the threat of vicious circularity, which «derives
from the fact that seriously and correctly to use considerations or reasons
in favor of a belief is to use (i) other things one believes with justification
and (ii) their (justifiedly believed) appropriate connection with the belief
targeted for justification»42. One way to deal with the threat of infinite
regress is to reject the argumentative account of justification entirely and
to claim that a belief can be justified without requiring S to provide justi-
fied reasons in its favor. If a belief can acquire positive epistemic status in-
dependently of any justifying reasons, then it shows that justification is not
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38. KIP, p. 236.
39. L. BONJOUR, «Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness», p. 88.
40. Cfr. A. M. LIZ, Justificar y Explicar, p. 157.
41. E. SOSA, «Modal and Other A Priori Epistemology», p. 4.
42. KIP, p. 254.
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always required for knowledge. As we have already argued, a belief can
have positive epistemic status via non-epistemic property43. Since «justifi-
cation» is a widely accepted term, which implies the idea of giving reasons
in favor of something, Sosa suggests the term «apt» to represent the posi-
tive epistemic status that a belief must have in order to be considered as
knowledge44. Putting aside Gettier-like cases, we can say that a belief must
be apt and true to qualify as knowledge. Thus, an example of an apt belief,
which does not require the support of any reasons, would be that of percep-
tual belief or memory belief. In such cases, the belief will lack justifica-
tion. And so we can have an apt belief without being justified45.
The issue at hand is that not all justification of beliefs is argumenta-
tive. We do not argue that beliefs can be justified if supported by reasons,
but we must also take into account that beliefs can also be justified without
being supported by reasons. Sosa uses the term «apt» to describe such be-
liefs. Justification then is demoted. In other words, an apt belief is not only
acquired via justification, but is also acquired via perception, introspec-
tion, memory, etc. Hence, we have two kinds of beliefs: an apt belief and a
justified belief 46. Sosa describes justification and aptness as follows:
«The justification of a belief B requires that B have a basis in its infer-
ence or coherence relations to other beliefs in the believer’s mind – as in
the “justification” of a belief derived from deeper principles, and thus “jus-
tified”, or the “justification” of a belief adopted through cognizance of its
according with the subject’s principles, including principles as to what be-
liefs are permissible in the circumstances as viewed by that subject.
The aptness of a belief B relative to an environment E requires that B
derive from what relative to E is an intellectual virtue, i.e., a way of arriv-
ing at belief that yields an appropriate preponderance of truth over error (in
the field of propositions in question, in the sort of context involved)»47.
Sosa tries to explain justification and aptness as a division between
what is internal and what is external to the subject respectively. Justifica-
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43. As we have seen earlier, a belief that has positive epistemic status without any sup-
porting reasons is explained through Sosa’s doctrine of supervenience. What Sosa intends
to show is that reasoning from something already believed with justification cannot serve as
a source of justification since it is not a non-epistemic property. Cfr. KIP, pp. 110-111.
44. For opting to use aptness instead of justification, justification becomes a sec-
ond rate concept in epistemology. Sosa writes, «“Justification is best demoted... to the
status of one way a belief may be apt for knowledge, while we allow others not depend-
ent on already attained justification: e.g., perception, perhaps, or introspection, or mem-
ory.” [KIP 283] Such (demoted) justification is always relative to arguments, premises,
reasons, or the like, already themselves justified or apt». E. SOSA, «Virtue Perspec-
tivism», p. 36.
45. Cfr. KIP, pp. 254-255.
46. Cfr. KIP, p. 256.
47. KIP, p. 144.
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tion, comments Sosa, amounts to a sort of inner coherence. As such, Sosa
views justification as internal. On the other hand, aptness amounts to the
truth-conduciveness of the cognitive faculty relative to an environment E.
Hence, Sosa views aptness as external 48. To distinguish between aptness of
belief and justification of belief, Sosa writes:
«Justification of belief that p requires the (implicit or explicit) use of
reasons in favor of P. A belief can be apt, however, without being thus justi-
fied: if it is a memory belief, for example»49.
Let us now consider aptness and justification in more detail. An apt
belief derives from the exercise of intellectual virtues relative to an envi-
ronment E. It reflects the operation of a reliable cognitive faculty. This im-
plies a restriction on the F-C pair in order to have an appropriate F-C pair
relevant to the reliability of the intellectual virtue in question. Such restric-
tion of Fs and Cs provides coherence in our output beliefs50. The restriction
of Fs and Cs is acquired through the epistemic perspective of the subject51.
As such, Sosa points out that «there is no aptness without coherence or
without at least our potential for coherence... for aptness is defined in
terms of Fs and Cs that ensure such potential»52. Note that there is no men-
tion concerning the active role of the cognitive agent in acquiring an apt
belief. Hence, the passive nature of the cognitive agent is duly implied. On
the other hand, a justified belief has its basis in the epistemic perspective of
the knowing subject. As BonJour comments, «it is the presence of such an
epistemic perspective, according to Sosa, that allows a body of beliefs to
be epistemically justified rather than merely apt»53. Thus, a belief is justi-
fied if it coheres within the epistemic perspective of the knowing subject54.
«Subjectively, then, Sosa looks to justify the person in a fully internalist
way, according to the coherency of her beliefs via reflection and perspec-
tive»55. Aptness and justification may be considered then as a distinction
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48. Cfr. KIP, pp. 289-292.
49. KIP, p. 290.
50. «It is hence only the coherence of the reliability of a faculty whose reliability is
noted within a world view that helps to make apt the beliefs attained by that faculty (or
intellectual virtue)». KIP, p. 210.
51. We will discuss in detail the necessary restriction that we have to make regard-
ing the F-C pair relevant to our cognitive faculties when we examine how Sosa deals
with the generality problem in the latter part of this thesis. Cfr. KIP, p. 274. See also
Part II, Section 1.2.4.
52. KIP, p. 292.
53. L. BONJOUR, «Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness», p. 88.
54. Cfr. KIP, p. 145.
55. R. UMBERS, Virtue Epistemology in Linda Zagzebski: The Virtuous Use of our
Cognitive Faculties, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Navarra, Pamplona 2002, p.
95 (Manuscript).
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between external and internal justification. As BonJour comments, «the
factors that confer epistemic authority on beliefs thus fall into two radical-
ly different categories: aptness, which is essentially external in character;
and a coherent epistemic perspective, which is essentially internal»56.
In accord with the distinction between justification and aptness,
Sosa sometimes speaks of reflective justification as opposed to animal jus-
tification. Reflective justification pertains to beliefs that are not only apt
but also justified. In other words, the reflective justification of beliefs re-
sulting from a certain reliable faculty is acquired through the coherence of
those beliefs within the epistemic perspective of the subject. An apt belief
is a virtue-derived belief. We grasp the relevant cognitive faculty through
our awareness of the appropriate F-C pair. It follows that if one is to be-
lieve out of a reliable faculty and if one has some awareness of the reliabil-
ity of such faculty from which the belief arises given the appropriate F-C
pair then one’s animal justification can be brought to a higher level of re-
flective justification through the epistemic perspective of the knowing sub-
ject. One can bring his animal justification to the level of reflective justifi-
cation if one has some awareness of one’s belief, the source of such belief
and the reliability of such source. An awareness of one’s animal endow-
ments is necessary in order to bring one’s justification to a higher level57.
Consider now the following, Sosa writes:
«The belief of a rational animal... would seem never to issue from un-
aided introspection, memory, or perception. For reason is always at least a
silent partner on the watch for other relevant data, a partner whose very si-
lence is a contributing cause of the belief outcome»58.
As we have already stated, «animal» justification seems inappropri-
ate for the kind of justification proper to rational beings. If our reasoning
faculty has the final say on all our cognitive activities and that it guides the
rest of our cognitive faculties, would we not always aim for some kind of
justification that is comparable to Sosa’s reflective justification? Can we
be content with animal justification only? Do we even have to consider an-
imal justification in our notion of epistemic justification?
1.2.2. Epistemic Perspectivism
Sosa emphasizes the importance of epistemic perspectivism in his
account of epistemic justification. What is epistemic perspective? Why is it
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56. L. BONJOUR, «Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness», p. 88.
57. Cfr. KIP, p. 282.
58. E. SOSA, «Virtue Perspectivism», p. 30. See also Part II, Section 1.2.1.
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important and necessary for the justification of beliefs? What is its role in
justifying one’s beliefs? How is it connected to truth? These are some of
the key questions worth considering. Perhaps, we begin by asking, «What
is an epistemic perspective?» Sosa writes:
«An account at least in broad outline of the ways in which member be-
liefs in various categories acquire epistemic justification: an account of
how one gets to know various sorts of things covered by beliefs in that
body»59.
In addition, epistemic perspective consists of having:
«meta-beliefs which positively attribute... object beliefs... to some fac-
ulty or virtue, ...and further meta-beliefs which explain how such a faculty
or virtue was acquired, and how such a faculty or virtue, thus acquired, is
bound to be reliable in the circumstances as (the believer) views them at
the time»60.
It was argued that a comprehensive and coherent set of beliefs does
not suffice to guarantee justification. Sosa argues that it is equally impor-
tant that S has some awareness of it to some extent. The knowing subject
must have some awareness that his beliefs do in fact cohere61. To provide
clarification, let us consider the «I/now system vs. N/t system»62.
I/now System N/t System
I am standing now. N is standing at t.
I am speaking now. N is speaking at t.
I flew from Providence to Cleveland yesterday. N flew from Providence to Cleveland
a day before t.
I now remember a JFK speech. N at t remembers a JFK speech.
In the I/now system, one has an account of one’s own faculties and
of how these faculties serve as reliable sources for what one believes as
opposed to the N/t system where one does so in the absence of such aware-
ness63. Hence, the notion of epistemic perspective tells us that one has
some awareness of one’s belief, its source and the reliability of its source.
We can easily appreciate how it may help the knowing subject to justify his
beliefs if he does, in fact, have some awareness of the source of his first-
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59. KIP, p. 97.
60. KIP, p. 136.
61. Cfr. L. BONJOUR and E. SOSA, Epistemic Justification, p. 113.
62. Cfr. KIP, p. 221.
63. Cfr. KIP, p. 222.
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order beliefs in the faculty from which they originated and have some
awareness of the reliability of such faculty64.
Why is epistemic perspective important and necessary? Consider
the problem of ostensible beliefs. These are beliefs taken as originating
from a certain cognitive faculty such as reason, memory, etc., without real-
ly being such. In other words, these are beliefs that do not derive from the
operation of our true reason, memory, etc. The question is how are we go-
ing to explain the epistemic justification for these beliefs? Will they, in
fact, enjoy the kind of justification that is pertinent to knowledge? Sosa ar-
gues that epistemic perspectivism provides the solution.
«Someone might have an excellent ability to retain beliefs once ac-
quired, and yet suffer from a terrible propensity to believe new things out
of the blue which come as apparent memories, as beliefs from the past»65.
The ostensible memory belief m cannot be said to have resulted
from the faculty of memory, its «supposed» corresponding faculty. To ex-
plain the «supposed» justification of such belief, we must consider the fol-
lowing assumptions: (1) the source for any given belief must be its corre-
sponding relevant faculty hence a memory belief m must have its source
from its faculty of memory, and (2) if the subject S «(a) is aware of his rel-
evant faculty F and its reliability, (b) finds himself with a belief B which he
justifiably attributes to his faculty F, and (c) on the basis of (a) and (b) jus-
tifiably sustains his belief B»66. Consequently, we can say that the basis for
the justification of an ostensible memory belief m is that S attributes the
ostensible memory belief m to have resulted ostensibly from the faculty of
memory and S believes in the reliability of his faculty67. Sosa comments:
«What justifies accepting one’s ostensible memory m in such cases is, I
suggest, a metabelief in the virtue of one’s memory which delivers m»68.
Cases such as the ostensible beliefs shown above indicate the im-
portance of epistemic perspective in the conception of epistemic justifica-
tion. Sosa thinks that «the requirement of an epistemic perspective seems
an indispensable prerequisite for an apt system of beliefs. This epistemic
perspective would be constituted by beliefs about one’s basic sources of
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64. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Virtue Perspectivism», p. 30.
65. KIP, p. 226.
66. KIP, p. 233.
67. The source of the ostensible memory belief m is not its faculty of memory, but
its ampliative, coherence-seeking reason. The ampliative, coherence-seeking reason «is
just reason in its role as seeker of coherence and comprehensive». KIP, p. 233. We will
speak more of the importance of the coherence-seeking reason later.
68. E. SOSA, «Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge», p. 177.
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knowledge»69. In addition, he affirms that the epistemic perspectivism may
also help in dealing with the generality problem, and with the new evil-de-
mon problem70. We can add the meta-incoherence problem in the list. Of
course, we will discuss these problems in their proper moment. In any
case, the point of our discussion is to show the importance and necessity of
having an awareness of one’s belief, the source of such belief and the relia-
bility of such source. It is not enough that one believes out of intellectual
virtue, but it is equally important that one must be aware in doing so71. It
will certainly explain how a knowing subject can have a reflective justifi-
cation in his believing that p if he has «epistemic perspective» of his be-
liefs. «Placing beliefs in epistemic perspective means taking note of the
sources of one’s first order beliefs and of how reliable these sources are in
different kinds of circumstances, say, of lighting and distance for beliefs
based on the faculty of visual perception»72.
Can we admit that one can be reflectively justified without some
kind of awareness of his beliefs, its source, and the reliability of its source?
Take the case of Magoo, who is unaware of the appropriate F-C pair for his
visual faculty. He emits judgments that most often mislead him. He has no
idea of the reliability of his visual faculty from which his beliefs originate.
Given his situation, we will say that reflective justification for his beliefs is
unattainable. The Magoo example shows us that through epistemic per-
spective, one comes to know about the reliability (or, at least, one would
know the limitation) of his cognitive faculties. As Sosa points out, it is im-
portant to «...attain some grasp of the true extent and nature of [one’s]
competence (or quasi-competence)»73. With this, we can appreciate the im-
portant role of epistemic perspective in Sosa’s VP; that is, one acquires
good awareness of his intellectual aptitude which is an essential factor to
be considered in the justification of one’s own beliefs. One will know that
he is likely to be right in his «believings» and not just accidentally so.
As regards our question concerning the connection of epistemic
perspective to truth, we can say that if one has some awareness that «one
has been persistently successful in a certain field F and circumstances C,
and one is then able to make an explanatory induction or projection that
one is the sort of being who would be successful in that field given the per-
tinent circumstances that have persistently prevailed»74, then one would
have no reason to think why he would not obtain the truth. One would
think that he is reliable in acquiring true beliefs and avoiding falsehoods.
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69. KIP, p. 222.
70. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge», p. 178.
71. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Virtue Perspectivism», p. 30.
72. G. AXTELL, «Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology», p. 4.
73. E. SOSA, «Virtue Perspectivism», p. 34.
74. Ibid., p. 35.
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All is needed to have a general perspective of one’s own beliefs and the re-
liability of their source to establish the connection between epistemic per-
spective and truth.
The question now is, «Is it possible to fulfill the epistemic perspec-
tive that Sosa requires for reflective justification?» Is it plausible to admit
«that believers typically have a true grasp of their cognitive faculties or a
true grasp of which faculty has produced a particular belief?»75 Greco tells
us that it is implausible to accept epistemic perspectivism, since typically
we do not seem to have it. We lack beliefs about the source of our first order
beliefs and the reliability of their source. Take, for instance, our belief that
there is a bird outside our window. Do we have further beliefs about the
source of that belief and about the reliability of that source? Of course, as
seen earlier, Sosa would tell us that epistemic perspective only requires that
we have some kind of awareness even if it is only sketchy and generic76.
«...in the typical case a believer will not have a true grasp of the inven-
tory of cognitive faculties she possesses, nor will she have a perspective on
which faculty is responsible for producing the particular belief in question.
On the other hand, there does seem to be something importantly right about
Sosa’s proposal. I want to argue that Sosa is right to invoke S’s point of
view as an important element for having knowledge, but that he invokes
S’s point of view in the wrong sense»77.
Greco does acknowledge the positive insight behind epistemic per-
spective in the sense that it underlines the subjective aspect of justification.
However, Greco thinks that subjective justification can be explained in
some other way78.
1.2.3. Coherence-Seeking Reason
«Epistemic perspectivism is a view one is led to in response to cer-
tain problems with coherence theories of epistemic justification»79. One of
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75. J. GRECO, «Virtues and Vices in Virtue Epistemology», p. 563.
76. Whether it is possible or not to have «epistemic perspective» is an all-important
question because it eventually leads to the question of the possibility of reflective
knowledge. Greco argues that requiring epistemic perspective is too strong as a require-
ment for knowledge. In such case, it poses a problem to Sosa’s distinction between ani-
mal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We will discuss this problem in the next sec-
tion. Cfr. J. GRECO, «Virtues in Epistemology», pp. 299-303. See also E. SOSA, «Virtue
Perspectivism», p. 30.
77. J. GRECO, «Virtues and Vices in Virtue Epistemology», p. 563.
78. See Part II, Section 2.3.2.
79. E. SOSA, «Beyond Scepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge», p. 178.
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the advantages of having «epistemic perspective» is that it promotes co-
herence of beliefs and the likelihood of obtaining true beliefs. An aware-
ness of the coherence of beliefs is necessary for justification80. How can
we know that our perspectival beliefs are true? To place our first order be-
liefs in «epistemic perspective» entails that we have a reason to think that
such beliefs are true. The truth of our beliefs is just a consequence of our
awareness of the reliability of the faculty that is «responsible» for our be-
liefs. Hence, we have a reason to think that our beliefs are true and reli-
able81.
As seen earlier, comprehensive coherence alone is not enough to
induce epistemic justification. Can we conclude that having a comprehen-
sive coherent set of beliefs is without cognitive worth? Sosa tells us that
internal coherence of beliefs –by itself– is without cognitive value, but it
becomes valuable if combined with other faculties because it provides a
more comprehensive grasp of the truth. Internal coherence may be
thought of as a coherence-seeking reason. Internal coherence of beliefs
requires the operation of reason82. Thus, we say that a «coherence-seeking
reason is also a reliable source of true belief and hence a source of epis-
temic justification»83. Perhaps, we can try to explain this in more detail.
Sosa says that one hopes to aim for coherence and that one also hopes to
have other faculties aside from reflexive reason (or coherence-seeking
reason). Of course, one can say that it is better to have both than to have a
mere internal coherence or to have the other additional faculties. Accord-
ingly, if we now consider a transmission faculty such as retentive memory
by itself, we can say that it will not guarantee that it will yield much truth.
Obviously, the quality of beliefs produced by transmission faculties will
depend upon the quality of the transmission and the quality of the input
beliefs. In any case, Sosa tells us that it is wrong to think that such faculty
is without cognitive worth because if such faculty is to be combined with
the other faculties, it will increase the total yield of true beliefs as com-
pared to its absence. Again, we prefer to have the retentive memory along
with the other cognitive faculties than not to have it at all. Mutatis mutan-
dis, a coherence-seeking reason, if combined with the other faculties, will
surely provide a better grasp of truth as compared to its absence. This is
what Sosa proposes84.
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80. «The coherence needed for epistemic justification in a system of beliefs re-
quires that the system be appropriately comprehensive, which means that it must in-
clude an epistemic (meta) perspective, and a suitable complement of foundational be-
liefs!» L. BONJOUR and E. SOSA, Epistemic Justification, p. 112.
81. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology», p. 103.
82. Cfr. ibid., p. 106.
83. J. GRECO, «Virtues in Epistemology», p. 291.
84. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology», p. 106.
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«How does internal coherence, of little significant epistemic value in it-
self, become more valuable when combined with external aptness? Coher-
ence-seeking inferential reason, like retentive memory, is of epistemic val-
ue when combine with externally apt faculties of perception, because when
so combined it, like retentive memory, give us a more comprehensive grasp
of the truth than we would have in its absence»85.
We need to take into account that the constitution and the persist-
ence of our comprehensive coherent set of beliefs indicate the operation of
our virtuous faculty of reason86. How else can one have a comprehensive
coherent set of beliefs if not by reasoning well? Coherence comes in de-
grees. Hence, to have a broader coherence is of more value because it pro-
vides a more likelihood of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding falsehoods.
In other words, it shows that broad coherence is valuable because it is truth
conducive. No doubt, one can disagree with Sosa as regards the truth con-
duciveness of having a broad coherence such as the case of the Cartesian
demon’s victim87. How Sosa will respond to this will just have to wait until
we discuss the New Evil Demon Problem.
1.3. A Remedy to Reliabilism
If VP is an improved reliabilism, then let us find out if Sosa is able
to handle the three problems akin to reliabilism. We may begin our discus-
sion with the «new evil demon» problem.
The New Evil Demon Problem
Our intuition tells us that the evil demon victim is somehow justi-
fied in his believing despite the unreliability of his cognitive process. His
belief that p is justified insofar as it is produced by his cognitive faculties
that are said to be virtuous in our «actual» environment. The problem with
reliabilism is that he cannot explain the internal justification of the evil de-
mon victim. Let us look into Sosa’s proposal.
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85. E. SOSA, «Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles», pp. 279-280.
86. Cfr. ibid., p. 280.
87. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology», p. 107. What does a
broader coherence involve? Sosa writes, «This broader conception of the coherence of
one’s mind involves not only the logical, probabilistic, and explanatory relations among
one’s first-order beliefs, but also coherence between these beliefs and one’s sensory and
other experiences, as well as comprehensive coherence between first-order experiences,
beliefs, and other mental states, on one side, and beliefs about first-order states, on the
other». E. SOSA, «Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles», p. 280.
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«On the present proposal, aptness is relative to an environment. Rela-
tive to our actual environment A, our automatic experience-belief mecha-
nisms count as virtues that yield much truth and justification and aptness.
Of course, relative to the demonic environment D, such mechanisms are
not virtuous and yield neither truth nor aptness. It follows that relative to D
the demon’s victims are not apt, and yet relative to A their beliefs are
apt»88.
As the above indicates, «it is in this relativized sense that the victim
of the demon can have epistemically justified beliefs even when being de-
ceived»89. We can show the above argument of Sosa as follows.
Demonic environment D
*S’s cognitive faculties are said to be vicious relative
Knowing subject S to the demonic environment. S’s belief that p is not apt.
(Cognitive faculties of S) Our «actual» environment A
*S’s cognitive faculties are said to be virtuous relative
to our «actual» environment. S’s belief that p is apt.
If we now consider the evil demon victim, we can say that relative
to our actual environment A, the victim’s belief is both justified and apt.
However, relative to the demonic environment D, the victim’s belief is not
justified or apt. Thus, we say that the evil demon victim is considered vir-
tuous and internally justified in his beliefs. The evil demon victim, Sosa ar-
gues, «seems not deprived of ordinary justification, since his beliefs still
derive from sources that we recognize as justification-conferring: namely,
sensory experience, memory, etc. The environment changes radically, but
the victim retains and uses a repertoire of intellectual virtues. True, be-
cause the environment is so radically abnormal and wrong for his normal
virtues, those virtues may not qualify as virtuous relative to that environ-
ment»90. Hence, Sosa claims that the demon victim would lack knowledge,
but he would certainly be blameless and virtuous91. We can conclude that
Sosa’s strategy to deal with the new evil-demon problem is to distinguish
internal justification from external justification, which is a distinction be-
tween justification and aptness.
Can we not say that it is the epistemic community that evaluates
which faculties are virtuous or vicious? In Part II, we stated that it is the
epistemic community that evaluates the relevant cognitive faculties perti-
nent to the relevant F-C pair. Thus, the above shows that we estimate the
146 ARNOLD NARCISO IBARRA
88. KIP, p. 289.
89. R. FOLEY, «A Trial Separation between the Theory of Knowledge and the The-
ory of Justified Belief», p. 68.
90. L. BONJOUR and E. SOSA, Epistemic Justification, p. 156.
91. Cfr. KIP, p. 289.
{
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 146
victim’s belief that p to be in some way justified since we deemed virtuous
the cognitive faculties from which his beliefs derived relative to our envi-
ronment. As Sosa would claim, it is reasonable to say that the victim is
somehow justified in his believing. Hence, we may say that it is the epis-
temic community that dictates the relevant correlation between the cogni-
tive faculties and the appropriate environment for such faculties. Accord-
ingly, it must be the epistemic community that states which cognitive
faculties are pertinent in the formation of beliefs, and which environment
is congenial for the cognitive faculty in question92. The important point we
can draw from all these is that epistemic justification does have a social di-
mension which we need to take into account in order to provide an ade-
quate view of epistemic justification. Aside from considering the environ-
ment E as part of the external factors that may influence the knowing
subject to justify his beliefs, we should also consider the epistemic com-
munity to which the knowing subject belongs.
The Meta-Incoherence Problem
In the meta-incoherence problem, S is now internally unjustified de-
spite having a reliable cognitive process. Again, Sosa’s distinction of justifi-
cation and aptness nicely handles the problem. In this case, the subject S’s
belief –being internally unjustified despite its reliable cognitive process– is
said to be apt but not justified due to S’s absence of epistemic perspective93.
Greco says that Sosa tries to resolve the problem by resorting to his idea of
epistemic perspectivism. Thus, «the general idea is that an appropriate per-
spective on one’s belief and its source affords one a kind of internal justifi-
cation that the clairvoyant lacks: specifically, one is allowed to see one’s be-
lief as reliably produced, and so not just “out of the blue”»94.
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92. «What makes the subject epistemically blameless and even admirable seems
not just a matter of his internal “justification” so much as a matter of the intellectual
virtue and total internal aptitude of that subject relative to an assumed group G and en-
vironment E, which absent any sign to the contrary one would take to be the group of
humans in a normal human environment for the sort of question under consideration.
Given these assumptions, the victim of the evil demon is virtuous and internally apt in
every relevant respect, not just in respect of enjoying internal justification, for the vic-
tim is supposed to be just like an arbitrarily selected normal human in all cognitively
relevant respects. Therefore, the internal structure and going-on in the victim must be at
least up to par, in respect of how virtuous that internal nature makes the victim, relative
to a normal one of us in our usual environment for considering whether or not we have a
fire before us or the like». KIP, p. 288.
93. Cfr. L. BONJOUR, «Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness», p. 90.
94. J. GRECO, «How to Preserve your Virtue while Losing Your Perspective», J.
GRECO (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell, United Kingdom 2004, p. 99.
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The Generality Problem
To handle the «generality problem», Sosa suggests that we need to
establish restrictions on the F-C pair that are pertinent to our cognitive fac-
ulties. In so doing, we will be able to acquire the relevant animal justifica-
tion. For instance, «any proposition P, let F be just {P, Not-P}, and let C be
the condition that: one-believes-P if P-is-true and one-believes-Not-P if
Not-P-is true»95. In this situation, we will have an impeccable faculty that
will always yield a true belief. To put it in another way, our true beliefs will
always be a product of our impeccable faculty. Hence, we need to provide
restrictions on our F-C pair. «What kind of restrictions should F-C pair
have?» Sosa writes:
1. «That F and C not be made so specific that one is always perfectly reli-
able and justified whenever one’s belief is true; but also
2. That they not be made so generic that one cannot explain how a subject
could have two beliefs both derived from the given faculty (e.g. from his
sight, or, more generally yet, from his sensory perception), though one is
justified while the other is not»96.
Sosa suggests that we generalize F-C pair, but to the extent that it
will be useful to the epistemic community to which S belongs and to S him-
self. Not just any F-C pair will be acceptable. Likewise, we must restrict F-
C pair to the extent that it can be usable by the epistemic community to
which S belongs and by S himself (this will allow S to acquire reflective
knowledge and not just to limit himself to animal knowledge)97. In the final
analysis, Sosa makes use of his idea of epistemic perspectivism to provide
a solution to the generality problem98. As Greco says, «Sosa’s position re-
quires an epistemic perspective on one’s own cognitive virtues in order to
have reflective justification, and in order to solve the generality prob-
lem»99.
To provide a solution to the generality problem, Conee and Feld-
man suggest that we must meet three conditions: (1) there must be a gener-
al basis for the identification of the relevant type of cognitive process for
the justification of beliefs; hence, it must be principled; (2) the identifica-
tion of the relevant type of process must be reliable in correlation with the
justification of the product beliefs; and (3) the solution must be in keeping
with the spirit of reliabilism. Given these conditions, the thesis of Conee
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95. KIP, p. 277.
96. KIP, p. 284.
97. Cfr. KIP, p. 291.
98. «To my mind the key is the requirement that the field F and the circumstances
C must be accessible within one’s epistemic perspective». KIP, p. 274.
99. J. GRECO, «Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology», p. 559.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 148
and Feldman is that the prospects for a solution to the generality problem
are «worse than bleak»100. And so, Conee and Feldman conclude:
«In the absence of a brand new idea about relevant types, the problem
looks insoluble. Consequently, process reliability theories of justification
and knowledge look hopeless»101.
Zagzebski argues that the generality problem is unavoidable for any
theory that includes the aspect of reliability as a necessary condition for
knowledge including her own theory. She suggests that a solution to the
generality problem may be provided through an empirical examination of
habit formation102. Likewise, Moros and Umbers point out that it is doubt-
ful that one can find a possible solution based on a purely reliabilist re-
sponse103.
As indicated above, Sosa focuses on the restrictions that need to be
applied on the F-C pair pertinent to the relevant cognitive faculty instead
of on the generality/specificity of the reliable cognitive process itself as a
way to handle the generality problem via his epistemic perspectivism. In
doing so, we are now left with the question as regards the generality/speci-
ficity required for the F-C pair needed for our relevant cognitive faculty.
Hence, the problem seems to be unresolved even with VP approach. Is a
solution possible for the generality problem?
The Circularity Problem
Recall that in Part I, one of the objections made by Sosa against re-
liabilism is the problem of circularity. The problem consists in the justifi-
cation of the reliability of the faculty in question by relying on that very
same faculty. Hence, we have «If P, therefore P». If Sosa’s basis for the
justification of beliefs is also reliability then he needs to provide us with an
explanation concerning the reliability of those cognitive faculties. In other
words, if beliefs are apt because of the reliability of the cognitive faculties
that produce them, then how can we know that these cognitive faculties are
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100. Cfr. E. CONEE and R. FELDMAN, «The Generality Problem for Reliabilism»,
pp. 373-374. «It is reasonable to look for a solution to the generality problem in three
places: common sense, science, and context... We shall argue that none of these ap-
proaches works out. This might raise the concern that our way of posing of the generali-
ty problem for reliabilism is somehow ill-conceived. It might be thought that the rele-
vant types are obvious when the question is properly understood, or that no general
solution is actually needed. We shall take up this line of thinking as well». Ibid., p. 374.
101. Ibid., p. 384.
102. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, Virtues of the Mind, pp. 309-310.
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reliable? Is it possible for Sosa to avoid vicious circularity in order to show
the reliability of such cognitive faculties?
Part of Sosa’s motivation for requiring epistemic perspective is that
external reliability is not enough to build on in order to explain adequately
the account of justification proper to rational beings. Indeed, this is part of
the limitations of reliabilism. Valeriano Iranzo agrees with Sosa that «pure
reliabilism is not an appropriate account of justification because it over-
looks the agent’s epistemic perspective»104. Hence, with epistemic perspec-
tivism, Sosa is able to show the internal aspect needed for the justification
of beliefs. Through epistemic perspective, the knower takes note of the re-
liability of the faculty from which his beliefs originated. If one has some
awareness of the reliability of his cognitive faculties given the appropriate
F-C pair then it is understandable to see why such knower will think that
he is likely to be right with his beliefs. The knower does have a reason for
thinking that his perspectival beliefs are correct. The question now is, «Do
we need to have a further awareness of the awareness of the reliability of
our cognitive faculties?» In other words, should not our awareness be a
justified awareness? Should we not justify also our perspectival beliefs? A
vicious circle lurks! BonJour comments:
«...the crucial question that must be asked is: are these perspectival beliefs
genuinely justified from the person’s internal perspective in the epistemologi-
cally relevant sense that he has a reason to think that they are true?»105.
If the justification of the first-order belief derives from the justifica-
tion of believing that one is likely to be correct for believing that p, then
perspectival belief cannot derive its justification in terms of a justified
higher meta-belief. This will certainly lead to circularity. Sosa suggests
that we invoke the internal coherence of the knower’s system of beliefs
which includes perspectival beliefs and proposes such coherence for the
justification of the knower’s beliefs106. Sosa writes:
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103. Cfr. E. MOROS and R. UMBERS, «Distinguishing Virtues from Faculties in
Virtue Epistemology», p. 66. Recall that Conee and Feldman suggest that one of the
conditions that must be satisfied to provide solution to the generality problem is that it
must keep the spirit of the reliabilist approach. This may appear contrary to what Za-
gzebski, Moros and Umbers point out above. Perhaps, we may understand that Conee
and Feldman suggest that the solution must be in keeping with the spirit of reliabilism
for the simple reason that it is a problem proper to a reliabilist theory. In so doing, one
can show that the theory of reliabilism is indeed plausible.
104. V. IRANZO, «Justificación y perspectiva epistémica», Revista de Filosofía, 31
(2006) 22.
105. L. BONJOUR, «Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness», p. 93.
106. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology», p. 105. «...some sort of
awareness of the coherence of one’s beliefs is required for justification. But this aware-
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«“...the fact that the pattern fits one’s experience and is accepted or sus-
tained in part at least because of that”. For if this answer can be sustained,
then it provides a way of stopping the threatening regress»107.
Sosa’s suggestion may still appear circular given that the reliability
of the cognitive faculty is shown by making use of that very same faculty.
Suffice it to say that in terms of epistemic perspective one may have the
confidence about the reliability of his faculties. For the sake of simplicity,
we can state that part of Sosa’s strategy to handle the problem of circulari-
ty is to admit that it is not necessary for the knower to know that his facul-
ties are reliable; all that is necessary is that one’s faculty be reliable.
Hence, for unreflective or animal knowledge, one is required only to
«track» the truth, but for reflective knowledge, aside from tracking the
truth, one must also know that one’s faculty is reliable108. A closer look –as
Sosa would say– will show that the apparent circularity is only an illu-
sion109.
In any case, it is important to note that the appeal to comprehensive
coherence for justification must also take into account the reliability of the
cognitive faculties. Sosa argues that knowledge requires both internal jus-
tification and external aptness. We have to be both in good internal order
and appropriately connected to the world110.
1.4. A Proposed Account of Justification
Part of the problem in providing an adequate account of justifica-
tion is the ambiguity of the concept itself. Aside from the fact that there is
a lack of consensus in understanding epistemic justification, what may call
our attention is the «confusion between one’s being justified in believing
that p, and one’s justifying one’s belief that p»111. If we take the former to
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ness may be constituted by the sensitivity to such coherence that one manifests by ac-
cepting one’s system of beliefs (or a large enough fragment thereof) partly in virtue of
its coherence, and by adjusting one’s degree of assurance partly to the degree of coher-
ence involved». E. SOSA, «Virtue Perspectivism», p. 45.
107. Ibid., p. 48.
108. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles», p. 282.
109. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology», p. 109. For a more de-
tailed explication concerning the problem of circularity, see Sosa’s «Philosophical Scep-
ticism and Epistemic Circularity», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemen-
tary vol. 24 (1994) 263-290. See also Sosa’s «Reflective Knowledge in the Best
Circles» and Barry Stroud’s «Scepticism, “Externalism”, and the Goal of Epistemolo-
gy», Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary vol. 24 (1994) 291-307.
110. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles», p. 284.
111. W. ALSTON, Epistemic Justification, p. 82.
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understand epistemic justification, it shows that we are not required to
prove that we are justified in our belief such as being justified in our belief
that there is a bird outside our window. If we see a bird outside our win-
dow, then we must be justified in our belief just by seeing it. There is no
need to provide reasons for so believing. Hence, our perceptual beliefs
would fall under this category. If we take the latter, then it would mean
that we are required to show why we are justified for so believing. This
would entail that we must be capable of justifying our belief. As Sosa
would say, we must be able to defend our belief in the arena of reflection112.
But if we accept this to be the correct understanding of epistemic justifica-
tion, then we will have a problem «justifying» our perceptual beliefs which
do not require such condition. As Alston comments:
«It may be claimed that the activity concept is fundamental in another
way, viz, by virtue of the fact that one is justified in believing that p only if
one is capable of carrying out a justification of the belief. But if that were
so, we would be justified in far fewer beliefs than we suppose. Most human
subjects are quite incapable of carrying out a justification of any perceptual
or introspection beliefs»113.
As indicated above, we have two ways of looking at epistemic justi-
fication. Internalism114 admits the former. Generally speaking, the internal-
ist maintains that for a belief to be justified one has to have adequate
grounds for believing that p and the belief in question must be based on
those grounds, be it through reasons or evidence115. Others also maintain
that one must fulfill his epistemic duty, such as conducting one’s cognitive
inquiries so as to attain truth and avoid falsehood in the light of some
norms or principles, or to look for more reasons or evidence, or to do what
one should do so as to exclude those factors that are incompatible with his
believing that p, or the need of «perspective» of the knower, etc.116. In any
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112. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Two False Dichotomies Foundationalism/Coherentism and In-
ternalism/Externalism», Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Oxford
University Press, New York 2004. Online: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philoso-
phy/Sosa/Archives/TwoFalseDichotomies.pdf. (Last Checked: April 15, 2007).
113. W. ALSTON, Epistemic Justification, p. 83, Footnote 3.
114. See Part I, Section 3.
115. «Nearly everyone agrees that it isn’t sufficient for a belief’s justification that
one has good reasons or adequate evidence for it. In addition, the belief must be based
on those reasons or that evidence if it is to count as justified. This latter is called a “bas-
ing requirement”». M. BERGMANN, Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epis-
temic Externalism, Oxford University Press, New York 2006, p. 4.
116. Alston provides a detailed explication on the notion of epistemic justification.
In a nutshell, Alston concludes that epistemic justification is not a necessary condition
for knowledge. Some of the ideas presented above were taken from Alston’s explication
of justification. Cfr. W. ALSTON, Epistemic Justification, pp. 172-182. Other examples
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case, these conditions for the justification of beliefs can be satisfied, at
best, by a normal mature human being. Obviously, we need to exclude
children and unsophisticated adults in these cases. Perceptual beliefs
would be a problem for normal mature people given that perceptual beliefs
(conscious or unconscious) do not require epistemic obligations or provid-
ing reasons/evidence as described above. On the other hand, externalism
such as reliabilism chooses the latter. Reliabilism claims that a belief is
justified if such belief derives from a reliable process. Reliabilism does not
require that the subject must have some awareness concerning the reliabil-
ity of the cognitive process for justification and it does not require that the
belief to be justified must cohere with the rest of the subject’s set of be-
liefs. From reliabilism’s point of view, the justification of beliefs of chil-
dren and unsophisticated adults can be easily explained. Goldman main-
tains that the degree of justifiedness is a function of the reliability of the
cognitive process used to arrive at a given true belief117. One is more justi-
fied than others insofar as one’s cognitive process is more reliable. As we
have already seen, it does not provide us a complete picture of justification
since it neglects the internal aspect of epistemic justification. So, we have
two opposing ways of looking at epistemic justification. The alternative is
to combine these two insights.
As a way to improve reliabilism, Sosa suggests that we add the
«epistemic perspective» of the subject aside from having a reliable cogni-
tive faculty in order to take into account the internal aspect of justification.
In view of reliabilism, is the reliability of cognitive faculties not a conse-
quence of the virtuous use of cognitive faculties? If so, then the degree of
justifiedness will be a function of the proper exercise of cognitive faculties
on the part of the epistemic agent. It follows that the more intellectually
virtuous the epistemic agent is, the more he would be in a position to justi-
fy his «believings». The use of cognitive faculties as part of justifying
one’s beliefs agrees with the insights of reliabilism. Likewise, the acquisi-
tion of intellectual virtues –thanks to the personal effort of the epistemic
agent– and the exercise of these virtues agree with the insights of Sosa’s
reflective justification of beliefs. Hence, our earlier suggestion of distin-
guishing cognitive faculties from intellectual virtues remains to be advan-
tageous in providing an adequate account of epistemic justification.
If epistemic justification requires the knower to have adequate
grounds for believing, then beliefs of children and unsophisticated adults
are considered unjustified. They do not provide reasons for their beliefs or
better yet, they are incapable of justifying their beliefs. Nonetheless, Sosa
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of epistemic obligations may be, for instance, «one should refrain from believing that p
if one does not possess adequate evidence that p». Cfr. ibid., p. 174.
117. Cfr. A. GOLDMAN, «What is Justified Belief», p. 345.
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would say that their beliefs are apt since their beliefs derive from the use
of their cognitive faculties and thus can be considered knowledge. Moros
and Umbers comment:
«If a child who is not yet using her reason can be justified in her be-
liefs, this will be to the involuntary but proper functioning of her cognitive
faculties»118.
This agrees with our intuition that they do in fact possess knowl-
edge without needing to justify their beliefs. It appears that Sosa’s distinc-
tion of aptness and justification provides, at least in part, a correct under-
standing of epistemic justification and it does explain nicely how both
children and mature adult people can possess knowledge. Nonetheless,
Sosa’s animal justification appears to be a bit confusing. It is clear that an-
imal justification refers to aptness. But for the sake of simplicity, why not
just call a child’s belief apt instead of referring to it also as «animally» jus-
tified and call a normal adult’s beliefs justified if such belief derives from
the exercise of intellectual virtues. Hence, this will agree with our intuition
that some beliefs are justified 119 and some beliefs are apt. Sosa would cer-
tainly agree with that as he writes:
«So there must be ways to acquire epistemically justified beliefs with-
out reaching them as conclusions from premises known with epistemic pri-
ority. If that is so, might not beliefs acquired perceptually attain epistemic
justification precisely by being so acquired? Such beliefs might be “direct-
ly” justified, in the sense of acquiring justification, but not through a
process of reasoning that leads to their acceptance as a conclusion»120.
Accordingly, what we are suggesting is to understand epistemic jus-
tification as a necessary condition for reflective knowledge. In other
words, justification is required for «reflective beliefs»121 because we need
to provide adequate grounds in accepting or believing them. These kinds
of beliefs require the exercise of our intellectual virtues understood as the
virtuous use of one’s cognitive faculties. Aptness, on the other hand, en-
tails the use of cognitive faculties.
We accept Sosa’s distinction of aptness and justification. Alterna-
tively, we may call such distinction unreflective justification and reflective
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118. E. MOROS and R. UMBERS, «Distinguishing Virtues from Faculties in Virtue
Epistemology», p. 69.
119. In this sense, a justified belief is also an apt belief since intellectual virtues are
understood as habits of cognitive faculties. Thus, an apt belief does not necessarily im-
ply that it is a justified belief but a justified belief does imply that it is an apt belief.
120. E. SOSA, «Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge», p. 282.
121. As Sosa would claim, these are beliefs that one can defend in the arena of re-
flection. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Two False Dichotomies» [Online].
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justification. This will provide continuity to Sosa’s unreflective and reflec-
tive knowledge as we shall see later122. Sosa is right in distinguishing
knowledge acquired by small children and animal from the knowledge ac-
quired by mature adult persons. Undeniably, there is a huge difference in
epistemic quality between the two. It is important to recognize such differ-
ence. However, we reject the term «animal» knowledge so as to avoid hu-
manizing the brutes. We do not deny the commonality of knowledge ac-
quired by small children and animals, but we must recognize that there is
an «ontological» difference between children and animals. We can say that
children are «rational in potency» whereas animals are not. And because of
the rational nature of human beings, human knowledge is never on par
with animal knowledge. We can maintain that we humans have two differ-
ent levels of knowledge123. In accord with Sosa, we may refer to it as unre-
flective and reflective knowledge. No doubt, more is needed to explain hu-
man knowledge as we shall discuss in the next section. This is just a
passing remark so as to stress the importance of understanding justification
as pertinent to «reflective» beliefs while aptness is pertinent to «unreflec-
tive» beliefs. Reflective beliefs may be regarded as «belief of high epis-
temic quality» as Sosa describes:
«Belief of high epistemic quality is belief that is not only true but man-
ifests good command of the subject matter and full competence on its ques-
tions, and especially on the very question at issue, the question, let us say,
whether p... It may now be argued that someone can really know that p, can
have the best knowledge that p, only if his belief that p manifests full com-
petence on the question whether p. Knowledge manifesting only partial
competence is a lesser grade of knowledge... plain knowledge, as ordinari-
ly understood, should not be confused with fully competent believing»124.
In accord with Alston125, we have shown that epistemic justification
is not a necessary condition for knowledge. Likewise, we do not deny the
importance of epistemic justification in our theory of knowledge. As ration-
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122. We think that the term unreflective justification is also an appropriate term to
describe a child’s belief. Given that it is unreflective, it shows that providing reason for
a child’s belief is not required. Hence, we continue to have the advantage of Sosa’s dis-
tinction of aptness and justification.
123. J. A. CUADRADO, Antropología filosófica: Una introducción a la filosofía del
hombre, EUNSA, Pamplona 2001, p. 53. Cuadrado speaks of two levels of human
knowledge: the sensible knowledge and the intellectual knowledge. The intellectual
knowledge requires the sensible knowledge. It shows that without the sensible knowl-
edge, it is not possible for «man» to have intellectual knowledge. In fact, this is how hu-
man knowledge is understood in the classical sense. We shall speak more of this in the
next section.
124. E. SOSA, «Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge», p. 274.
125. Cfr. W. ALSTON, Epistemic Justification, p. 172.
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al beings, we cannot content ourselves with having apt beliefs. Rather, we
strive for «beliefs of high epistemic quality» which require the kind of justi-
fication that manifests our epistemic responsibility126 in areas such as histo-
ry, science, philosophy, etc. Our intellectual inquiry should always be in ac-
cord with our epistemic responsibility in fulfilling that need of acquiring
true beliefs and avoiding falsehoods. Hence, should we not attempt to exer-
cise our cognitive faculties in a virtuous manner so as to bootstrap our «jus-
tification» to a higher level that is proper to us humans? As William James127
would say, if we have the epistemic obligation to know the truth and avoid
falsehood, it follows that we will try to justify our beliefs in a somewhat
similar fashion as described by Sosa’s reflective justification. It is precisely
in this sense that the epistemic justification proper to us is not what we may
call super-justification as maintained by Descartes. We might be able to de-
scribe the kind of justification appropriate to us humans as a middle ground
justification between animals and angels. We are not gods hence the possi-
bility of error is always before us. Nonetheless, in trying to fulfill our epis-
temic responsibility in acquiring true beliefs we acquire truths already. The
epistemic means that we employ should already be considered as ways of
acquiring true beliefs since those «epistemic means» may already be consid-
ered as our way of justifying our beliefs128. Undeniably, infallibility is not a
possibility, but nonetheless we do possess knowledge hence truth. The more
intellectually virtuous we are in our cognitive activities, the more reliable we
will be in acquiring true beliefs and avoiding falsity.
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126. Code provides us with a brief description of epistemic responsibility. She
writes, «Questions about epistemic responsibility take some of their thrust from what
are best called the “empirico-realist” implications of some version of foundationalism.
There is a realist imperative at the center of all the exhortations to responsibility I have
cited in my opening examples: an insistence that responsible knowledge claims can
arise only out of investigations, in part empirical and inductive, that attempt to discover
how things really are, both actually and potentially. To this extent, questions about epis-
temic responsibility arise out of sympathy with some conceptions of the foundationalist
project: the goal is to ensure that knowledge claims are well-grounded in the world, that
they respect the constraints the world imposes upon those who would know it». L.
CODE, Epistemic Responsibility, p. 6.
127. Cfr. W. JAMES, «The Will to Believe», p. 558.
128. Michael Lynch points out the following: «...I can control how I go about pur-
suing the truth, by paying careful attention to the evidence, giving and asking for rea-
sons, doing adequate research, remaining open-minded, and so on. In short, in saying
that truth is a worthy goal, we imply that you ought... to adopt policies, methods, and
habit of inquiry that are reliable, or that are likely to result in true beliefs. We ordinarily
think that it is good to give and ask for reasons, good to be open-minded, good to have
empirical evidence for one’s scientific conclusions, because these are methods of in-
quiry that lead us to the truth. If we didn’t value true belief, we wouldn’t value these
sorts of activities; and we value these sorts of activities because we think they will, more
often than not, lead us to believing truly rather than falsely». M. LYNCH, True to Life:
Why Truth Matters, p. 14.
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Can we think of justification as an epistemic need on the part of the
knowing subject in order to show the active role of the agent in his acquisi-
tion of knowledge? Is justification not a manifestation that when we accept
or believe that p, we believe it because it is reasonable to do so? It is right
to admit that epistemic justification comes in degrees. Some of our beliefs
are more justified than others. Hence, it is plausible to speak of a minimal
and a maximal justification129. A minimal justification would imply the vir-
tuous use of our cognitive faculties even if only a minimal amount of virtu-
ousness and reasoning, whereas a maximal justification would imply the
exercise of intellectual virtues (with a certain degree of stability and relia-
bility) complemented –although not essential– with Zagzebskian-type
virtues. We will speak of the role of cognitive faculties and intellectual
virtues in detail –Sosean and Zagzebskian virtues– in our discussion of
knowledge. At this point, it is enough to take into account that degrees of
justification can be admitted in the acquisition of beliefs with the implied
use of intellectual virtues.
Part of the motivation for the justification of beliefs is to strengthen
the connection between our beliefs and the truth of our beliefs. If our epis-
temic duty is to acquire beliefs and avoid falsehoods, then the question
worth considering, Riggs points out130, is which end of our goal carries the
more weight? In other words, should we give more importance to acquiring
true beliefs or avoiding false beliefs? No doubt that we value truth inas-
much as we disvalue falsehood. Whether we prefer to acquire true beliefs or
avoid false beliefs is another topic of debate. In any case, what we can say
is that a high standard of epistemic justification would put more weight on
the importance of avoiding falsehood as opposed to acquiring true beliefs.
Likewise, a low standard of epistemic justification would have the opposite
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129. One may think of using the term «low-grade» and «high-grade» justification
to describe that justification comes in degrees, that is, to admit that justification of be-
liefs will depend upon how intellectually virtuous the person is, who does the justifying.
We opt not to use these terms for it might create some confusion in relation to our un-
derstanding of knowledge. Sosa claims that knowledge seems a matter of degrees in the
sense that one may know more than others, e.g. how sure one is, how safe or unsafe,
how rationally justified one is, etc. (cfr. E. SOSA, «Human Knowledge, Animal and Re-
flective», Philosophical Studies, 106 [2001] 194.) If we admit the term «low-grade»
knowledge and «high-grade» knowledge to describe thus, it will refer to something dif-
ferent to what Zagzebski affirms. Zagzebski’s «low-grade» knowledge refers to knowl-
edge acquired by children and animals, which may be compared to Sosa’s animal
knowledge. On the other hand, Zagzebski’s «high-grade» knowledge refers to knowl-
edge acquired by mature adult persons, which may be compared to Sosa’s reflective
knowledge. We suggest that it is important that we define these terms with more preci-
sion as to avoid confusion. We shall make the necessary adjustment to use precise terms
in our discussion of Sosa’s animal and reflective knowledge. For Zagzebski’s low-grade
and high-grade knowledge, see her Virtues of the Mind, pp. 273-283.
130. Cfr. W. RIGGS, «Balancing Our Epistemic Goals», Nous, 37 (2003) 342-352.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 157
result. Riggs comments that there are no such theories of epistemic justifi-
cation that would provide criteria to the proper weightings of these two cog-
nitive goals. Hence, our question remains unanswered. Hilary Kornblith ar-
gues that we must accept truth as our epistemic goal. He writes:
«I have argued that epistemic evaluation finds its natural ground in our
desires in a way which makes truth something we should care about what-
ever else we may value. This provides us with a pragmatic account of the
source of epistemic normativity, but an account which is universal and also
allows truth to play a central role. Pragmatists have typically suggested that
epistemic evaluation will have little to do with truth; but if I am right, it is
for pragmatic reasons that truth takes on the importance it does in epis-
temic evaluation»131.
However, Moros thinks –in accord with Leonardo Polo– that it is
wrong to have a pragmatic understanding of truth. Rather, truth should not
only be regarded as an end for which we tend towards and which serves as
a guiding principle to our conduct, but it should also be considered as a
source of inspiration that can move our «hearts». It is right to say that we
desire truth and it is right to say also that in obtaining the truth, we are be-
ing perfected132. Indeed, «the very capacity to search for the truth and make
inquiry about it has of itself created the initial response. Man would never
embark on the search for anything he knew nothing about or which he sup-
posed to be quite beyond his reach»133. That not only we are capable of dis-
covering the truth but the truth itself continues to inspire us. We will al-
ways seek the truth134 and we can never remain indifferent to the truth135.
Speaking of truth, Aquinas points out that intellectual virtue confers
a good aptitude for the working of the intellect, which is to consider the
truth. He further admits that wisdom, science and understanding are all
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131. H. KORNBLITH, «Epistemic Normativity», Synthese, 94 (1993) 373.
132. «Por eso, no se trata solamente de buscar la verdad, sino de realizarse a partir
de ella, de acuerdo con el carácter efusivo del ser humano y la índole donante o trascen-
dental de la libertad. Si el hombre no tuviera carácter efusivo, encontrar la verdad sería
estéril, porque la verdad está destinada y no se estanca en su encuentro». L. POLO, La
persona humana y su crecimiento, EUNSA, Pamplona 21999, p. 202. «La verdad no es,
por tanto, sólo el fin o el término a partir del cual hemos de dirigir la conducta, sino que
puede ser una fuente de inspiración capaz de movilizar a la persona». E. MOROS, «Ob-
servaciones polianas a la definición del conocimiento», p. 205.
133. JOHN PAUL II, «Fides et ratio», n. 29, in L. HEMMING and S. PARSONS (eds.),
Restoring Faith in Reason, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana 2002.
134. «Man may be defined... as the one who seeks the truth». JOHN PAUL II, «Fides
et ratio», n. 28.
135. «Nadie puede permanecer sinceramente indiferente a la verdad de su saber. Si
descubre que es falso, lo rechaza; en cambio, si puede confirmar su verdad, se siente sat-
isfecho». J. A. CUADRADO, Antropología filosófica, p. 71.
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considered intellectual virtues insofar as they all provide aptness for the
consideration of truth136. To return to our initial question concerning our
two epistemic goals –to acquire truth and to avoid falsehood– Riggs sug-
gests that the answer may be found if we put our attention to understand-
ing 137. Understanding entails a clear grasp of some significant part of reali-
ty and achieving such understanding of the reality requires that we achieve
our two traditional epistemic goals to some extent138. Aquinas tells us that
understanding is the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration
of truth in itself. Hence, it is called the habit of principles139. Of course,
more could be said about understanding but at this point, it suffices to say
that intellectual virtues such as wisdom, science and understanding may
provide the solution to our problem insofar as these intellectual virtues en-
able a person to consider the truth in a virtuous manner. Hence, would
these intellectual virtues not serve the knower to weigh correctly the rela-
tive values of our two traditional cognitive goals?140. Aquinas writes:
«...a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable
to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil.
Wherefore, those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we
tell the truth and never tell a falsehood»141.
To end this section, what we would like to point out above all is that
our account of epistemic justification can be based on our distinction of
cognitive faculties and intellectual virtues. The use of cognitive faculties
provides aptness and the use of our intellectual virtues provides justifica-
tion for our beliefs. Justification depends upon the person who does the
justifying; hence, the possession of intellectual virtues complemented with
moral virtues will no doubt play an important role in the justification of be-
liefs and in the final analysis, in the acquisition of knowledge142.
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136. Cfr. S. Th., I-II, q. 57, a. 2.
137. Zagzebski comments that interest in virtue epistemology makes the recovery
of understanding more likely. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Recovering Understanding», M. STE-
UP (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility,
and Virtue, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, pp. 235-251. See also W. RIGGS,
«Understanding Virtue and the Virtue of Understanding», pp. 203-226.
138. Cfr. W. RIGGS, «Balancing Our Epistemic Goals», p. 350.
139. Cfr. S. Th., I-II, q. 57, a. 2.
140. Cfr. W. RIGGS, «Balancing Our Epistemic Goals», p. 349.
141. S. Th., I-II, q. 57, a.2.
142. It will suffice to consider the words of John Paul II to see the relevancy of
moral virtues in the pursuit of knowledge and truth. John Paul II writes, «The pursuit of
truth... is not always conducted with the same clarity and coherence. The natural limits
of reason and vanity of spirit may overshadow individual enquiries and not infrequently
divert them. The various demands of our different personal characters can overthrow the
truth. Yet, for all that they may evade it, the truth still influences life...». JOHN PAUL II,
«Fides et ratio», n. 28. See also Part II, Section 3.2.
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2. KNOWLEDGE
After having discussed aptness and justification, let us now exam-
ine Sosa’s view of knowledge. The all-important question that we will con-
sider in this section is «What is knowledge?» Earlier, we admitted that
children and unsophisticated adults as well as normal adults have knowl-
edge although distinctly. As such, Sosa proposes to explain knowledge in
terms of animal knowledge and reflective knowledge.
There seems to be a confusion concerning how knowledge should
be understood. For instance, consider the following:
«...there is a sense in which even a supermarket door “knows” when
someone approaches, and in which a heating system “knows” when the
temperature in a room rises above a certain setting. Such is “servo-mechan-
ic” knowledge. And there is also an immense variety of animal knowledge,
instinctive or learned, which facilitates survival and flourishing in an aston-
ishingly rich diversity of modes and environments. Human knowledge is
on a higher plane of sophistication, however, precisely because of its en-
hanced coherence and comprehensiveness and its capacity to satisfy self-
reflective curiosity»143.
No doubt, the word knowledge is used in a wide variety of ways.
As indicated above, we may even go as far as attributing knowledge to a
supermarket door or to computers, or to animals such as dolphins and
dogs, capable of learning a number of tricks. It makes sense to admit that
human knowledge must be different and on a higher plane. We should
bear in mind the following questions: How is human knowledge different
from that of «animal» knowledge or «servo-mechanic» knowledge? What
is involved in human knowledge? Why is our knowledge superior to that
of animals? What are the conditions for knowledge? In short, we shall ex-
amine what epistemology traditionally inquires into concerning knowl-
edge, that is, its nature, its conditions and its extent. Sosa maintains that
the concept of knowledge involves the following: «(a) “belief”: how sure
must one be? (b) “justification”: how much rational support is required
for one’s belief? (c) “reliability”: how reliable are one’s operative sources
or faculties? (d) “safety”: how easily might one have been wrong; how re-
mote is any possible belief/fact mismatch?»144. A full account of Sosa’s
VP involves the requirements of safety, of reliable faculties and of epis-
temic perspective145. Hence, our discussion of knowledge will take into
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143. KIP, p. 95.
144. E. SOSA, «Neither Contextualism nor Skepticism», S. LUPER (ed.), The Skep-
tics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate, Aldershot 2003, p. 169.
145. Cfr. L. BONJOUR and E. SOSA, Epistemic Justification, p. 170.
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account all these factors noted by Sosa. We shall see if Sosa’s view pro-
vides an adequate account of knowledge.
2.1. The Conditions for Knowledge
Knowledge puts us in contact with reality. It is undeniable that we
associate ourselves with the things around us. Aside from our need of
having an interpersonal relationship with other people, we also have a
need to make «contact» with nature, so to speak. No doubt, we use things
in order to be in this world. Even the simple act of eating or drinking can
be considered already as a way of putting ourselves in contact with sensi-
ble things. In short, we connect with reality. Mutatis mutandis, knowledge
also connects us with reality. When we say that «we know something»,
we are affirming that we know a certain portion of reality. We know when
we grasped the object known. Thanks to our senses and our intellect, it is
possible for us to capture a certain portion of reality. To see a bird outside
our window is to put ourselves in contact with the bird via our faculty of
sight. «Our knowledge begins with being (ens), known through the sens-
es»146.
Accordingly, knowledge is a relation between the knower and the
object known, without which knowledge will be impossible. S knows that
p when S establishes a relation with p. The link between the knowing sub-
ject and the object known is established by the true proposition that the
knower accepts or believes. In other words, the relation between the know-
er and the true proposition is established when the knower believes such
true proposition and consequently, puts the knower in contact with the re-
ality known. In consequence, the concept of belief shows that there is a
necessary connection between the knower who knows and what is known
by the knower147. If knowledge is nonaccidentally true belief, then we need
to explain the nonaccidental connection between the belief and the fact be-
lieved. We need to find out the conditions a belief must have in order to
qualify as knowledge. The knower must satisfy those conditions upon be-
lieving so that that his belief that p can qualify as knowledge. Now, the
conditions we established earlier for the justification of beliefs can be ap-
plied to our conditions for knowledge. Hence, if it is required to integrate
the positive insights of internalism and externalism to provide an adequate
account for justification, we must do likewise to our account for knowl-
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146. A. LLANO, Gnoseology, p. 140.
147. «El concepto de creencia viene a señalar la necesaria conexión entre la per-
sona que conoce y lo conocido por ella». E. MOROS, «Observaciones polianas a la
definición del conocimiento», p. 189.
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edge. As a minimal requirement for knowledge, Sosa tells us that knowl-
edge must be safe and it must be virtuous. Sosa holds:
«What distinguishes the case of 48 speckles where one guesses right
and does not know from the case of three speckles where one does enjoy
foundational knowledge by acquaintance? The relevant distinction is that
in the latter case, unlike the former, one’s belief is both safe and virtu-
ous»148.
Sosa argues that S fails to know even if S has the image of the 48
speckles in his consciousness such that S’s belief that p corresponds to
what is «given» in his consciousness since S could easily have believed
that the image before him has 48 speckles while it had one more speckle or
less. Of course, the situation dramatically changes if the image has 3
speckles. In such a situation, we would easily attribute S’s belief that p to
be in accord with the image in his consciousness. We can conclude that S’s
belief that p is safe since he will hold his belief that p only if p is true. Sosa
points out, however, that S’s belief that p being safe is not sufficient for
knowledge. Accordingly, he argues that it must also be virtuous. If such
conditions are satisfied, we can say that S knows that p149.
One’s belief must be safe
Why is it better to be safe than sensitive? The likes of Dretske, Noz-
ick and DeRose, among others, each in his own way, suggest the require-
ment of sensitivity for knowledge. A belief is said to be sensitive if and
only if were it not so that p, S would not believe that p150. The question now
is «what is it about sensitivity that makes it unacceptable as a requirement
for knowledge?» First, the problem with sensitivity as a condition for
knowledge is that it is too strong a requirement. If S will not believe that p
if p were false, then it appears that we are admitting that S is infallible in
his believings. Thus, S’s beliefs will always be true for he would not be-
lieve that p if p were false. Furthermore, since necessary truths can never
be false, it shows that the sensitivity requirement is not a necessary condi-
tion for knowledge. And second, to know that p, Sosa argues that we must
be able to rule out every alternative that is incompatible with our knowing
that p. An «alternative» denotes any incompatible possibility. This only ap-
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148. E. SOSA, «Consciousness and Self-Knowledge», p. 259.
149. Cfr. ibid., p. 260.
150. Cfr. E. SOSA, «How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What is
Known?», pp. 376-377.
151. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Neither Contextualism nor Skepticism», p. 173.
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plies to contingent truths and not to necessary truths since there is no pos-
sibility that can be incompatible with a necessary truth151. Such principle is
what Sosa calls the «principle of exclusion».
«PE In order to know a fact P one must exclude (rule out, know to be
false) every alternative that one knows to be incompatible with
one’s knowing that fact»152.
Considering the abovementioned, the sensitivity requirement be-
comes problematic. The condition of sensitivity is subject to skeptical sce-
narios. For us to know that p, we need to rule out the possibility that we are
being fooled by an evil-demon, say q. Ruling out such possibility is unlike-
ly for we may be fooled by an evil-demon into thinking that we are not
now being fooled by an evil-demon. Hence, by sensitivity requirement we
will not know that q and with PE, we will not know that p. The problem
with sensitivity requirement is that one may know that p without being
able to know whether one is wrong in thinking that he knows that p.
For a belief to qualify as knowledge, it must be related to the true
proposition, or such belief must be based on a deliverance that is appropriate-
ly related to the true proposition. Sosa suggests that if sensitive requirement
is inappropriate, then the alternative is the safety requirement153. He writes:
«Rather than requiring, as a necessary condition for knowing P, that if
P were false one would not believe it, the alternative is to require instead
that one would believe it only if it were true. According to this new condi-
tion, which I call «safety», in order to qualify as knowledge a belief needs
to be safe rather than sensitive. The new condition requires not that if P
were false one would not believe it, but rather this: that not easily would
one believe P without being right. Since subjunctive conditionals do not
contrapose, the sensitivity conditional (not-P _ not-BP) is not equivalent to
the safety conditional (BP _ P)»154.
Sosa argues that for a belief to be safe, such belief must be based on
a reliable indication. These indications are deliverances of epistemic
sources such as perception, memory, inference, etc. As such, if we refer to
the 3 speckles, one will take the deliverance of his faculty of sight as a reli-
able indicator that what he sees is a 3 speckles, hence in that «circum-
stances not easily would one believe as one does without being right»155.
Sosa writes:
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152. E. SOSA, «Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge», p. 277.
153. Cfr. E. SOSA, «How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is
Known?», p. 378.
154. E. SOSA, «Modal and Other A Priori Epistemology», p. 6.
155. E. SOSA, «Privileged Access», A. JOKIC and Q. SMITH (eds.), Consciousness:
New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press, New York 2003, p. 290.
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«Different sources correlate with different ways in which it may be said
that p. Someone may say it literally, of course, in person or in writing, and
S may hear it or read it. If we can believe our eyes or ears, moreover, it’s
because they tell us things. We experience visually or aurally as if p. Nor-
mally we accept such deliverances of our senses, unless we detect some-
thing untoward»156.
In order to accept the deliverances of an epistemic source, it is im-
portant to trust such a source. Deliverances must track the truth. Thus, one
must be attuned to the trustworthiness of the source responsible for such
deliverance. It is not enough for S to be guided by the deliverances of some
source to believe that p, rather it is equally important that S accepts the de-
liverance as a deliverance that tracks the truth, thanks to the reliability of
the source, in order to believe that p. Deliverance enables knowledge only
if it tracks the truth. Hence, we can say that S’s belief p is safe if S will ac-
cept such deliverance as deriving from a reliable source157. Sosa explains:
«S knows that p on the basis of an indication I(p) only if either (a) I(p)
indicates the truth outright and S accepts that indication as such outright, or
(b) for some condition C, I(p) indicates the truth dependently on C, and S
accepts that indication as such not outright but guided by C (so that S ac-
cepts the indication as such on the basis of C»158.
Note that the safety requirement will also encounter a problem as
regards necessary truths for it will trivially satisfy the safety condition. As
Sosa argues, the safety condition alone is not enough159. He tells us that
«knowledge requires one’s belief to be not only safe but also virtuously
sustained, through the use of a reliable ability or faculty, through an intel-
lectual virtue»160.
One’s belief must be virtuous
We already discussed the importance of intellectual virtue in our ac-
count of knowledge161. Hence, we will look at its importance briefly in our
present discussion. At this point, we have seen that one’s belief must de-
rive «from a way of forming beliefs that is an intellectual virtue, one that in
our normal situation for forming such beliefs would tend strongly enough
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156. E. SOSA, «Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge», p. 269.
157. Cfr. ibid., pp. 271-272.
158. Ibid., pp. 275-276.
159. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Modal and Other A Priori Epistemology», p. 6.
160. E. SOSA, «Privileged Access», p. 291.
161. See Part II, Section 1 for a detailed explication of Sosa’s account of intellectu-
al virtue and its role in the justification of beliefs and in the acquisition of knowledge.
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to give us beliefs that are safe»162. Such beliefs must be derived through the
use of intellectual virtues. If deliverances must track the truth and such de-
liverances depend on the reliability of its source, then it is obvious that
such source must be «an intellectual virtue». Thanks to our intellectual
virtue, Sosa would say, we will acquire true beliefs in a non-accidental way
hence knowledge since our intellectual virtue will lead us to believe what
is true and avoid what is falsehood.
Can we accept these conditions?
To claim that knowledge must be safe and virtuous seems to be
more appropriate to the sort of knowledge that a normal adult can possess.
It is true that Sosa nicely explains how a 3 speckles can be known by S and
that such knowledge can be considered safe since one will not easily be-
lieve it without being right. However, the safety requirement appears to be
too strong for a child’s knowledge since a child simply believes things
without considering whether he is right or wrong in believing what he be-
lieves. A child does not consider the circumstances in which he is situated
in such a way that he will not easily believe as he does without being right.
Hence, a «doxastic ascent»163 is not required for his beliefs, that is, to have
a «further belief that one’s senses work well in the circumstances, or the
like»164. Sosa tells us that we know that p only if our belief that p is safe,
that is, it must be that we will believe that p only if our belief that p were
true165. If that is the case, does this not imply that belief p requires a doxas-
tic ascent on the part of S? If we are correct in our claim, then it is obvious
that a doxastic ascent cannot be required from a child for he is incapable of
such. He simply takes things as they come. If Sosa claims that knowledge
being safe and virtuous pertains to animal knowledge, then it can never be
attributed to a child’s knowledge in virtue of our understanding of intellec-
tual virtues as distinct to cognitive faculties. «[A child does] not doubt
when it is not virtuous to do so, but [he does] not doubt when it is virtuous
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162. L. BONJOUR and E. SOSA, Epistemic Justification, pp. 138-139.
163. «Doxastic (from Greek doxa, ‘belief’), of or pertaining to belief. A doxastic
mental state, for instance, is or incorporates a belief. Doxastic states of mind are to be
distinguished, on the one hand, from such non-doxastic states as desires, sensations, and
emotions, and, on the other hand, from subdoxastic states. By extension, a doxastic prin-
ciple is a principle governing belief. A doxastic principle might set out conditions under
which an agent’s forming or abandoning a belief is justified (epistemically or other-
wise», J. HEIL, «Doxastic», R. AUDI (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy,
Cambridge University Press, New York 21999, p. 243.
164. Cfr. KIP, p. 182.
165. Cfr. «Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge», p. 278.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 165
to do so either»166. For a child to know that p, safety and intellectual virtues
are not necessary. A child can know that p through the involuntary use of
his cognitive faculties. Perceptual beliefs are certainly considered as cases
of knowledge167.
Can we not say that knowledge that is safe and virtuous does not
pertain to animal knowledge, but to a sort of knowledge similar to Sosa’s
reflective knowledge? If one is intellectually virtuous, then he will be in a
better position to know that p. As a consequence, it is «safe» to say that his
knowledge of p will be safe and virtuous. In accord with Juan Comesaña,
we conclude that safety is not a necessary condition for knowledge. A
child’s knowledge is not a sort of knowledge that requires safety. If we
cannot consider a child’s knowledge a safe knowledge, perhaps, we may
call it «unsafe knowledge», to borrow Comesanã’s suggestion168. The point
of our argument is that one can have knowledge without satisfying the re-
quirements of safety and virtuousness, which Sosa deems as necessary. If a
child can know that p through the involuntary use of his cognitive facul-
ties, then it must be due to the proper functioning of his cognitive faculties
which do put him in contact with the reality. Note that there is no doxastic
ascent on the part of the child in order to know that p.
Another point worth noting is the requirement of intellectual
virtues. Again, consider Sosa’s example of the 48 speckles and the 3
speckles. Would we not say that it is more necessary to have intellectual
virtues in order to believe correctly the image of the 48 speckles as having
48 speckles as opposed to the image of the 3 speckles as having 3 speck-
les? Since it is easier to tell a 3 speckles from a 48 speckles, we do not
think that it is necessary to have intellectual virtues to form such belief in
the way that we require intellectual virtue for reflective knowledge. We
grant Sosa’s proposal that knowledge must be safe and virtuous, but he
must provide us with an adequate explication concerning how we form be-
liefs in a virtuous manner169. The point to make is that it requires a lesser
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166. L. ZAGZEBSKI, Virtues of the Mind, p. 280.
167. Cfr. ibid., p. 279.
168. Cfr. J. COMESAÑA, «Unsafe Knowledge», Synthese, 146 (2005) 395-404.
Comesaña’s argument for rejecting the safety requirement is different from the argu-
ment we present above. Comesaña writes, «...why is it that safety is not a necessary con-
dition for knowledge?... It might be thought that by attacking safety as a necessary con-
dition on knowledge I am arguing against epistemic externalism – the thesis that the
epistemic status of a belief can depend on factors that are “external” to the subject, ei-
ther in the sense that they are not part of the subject’s mind or in the sense that they are
not accessible in a privileged way by the subject. The safety conditional can, after all, be
seen as an attempt to capture what it is for a belief to be reliable, and the requirement of
reliability is a paradigmatically externalist requirement». Ibid., p. 401.
169. «The consideration just advanced put a considerable burden on the virtuous-
ness condition. Sosa must say that the method by which the unjustified believer arrives
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degree of virtuousness to exercise one’s cognitive faculties to know a 3
speckles than to know a 48 speckles. Granted that the belief formed of a 3
speckles manifest an intellectual virtue, but what precludes us from form-
ing our belief of the 48 speckles in such a way that it will also manifest an
intellectual virtue?
2.2. Sosa’s Account of Knowledge
Sosa’s account of knowledge is structurally Cartesian since his ac-
count reflects Descartes’s distinction of cognitio and scientia. Sosa’s pro-
posal is a «bi-level epistemology that distinguishes animal knowledge, and
its constitutive cognitive virtues, from a reflective knowledge that in addi-
tion requires one’s beliefs to be defensible in the arena of reflection»170. To
cast doubts regarding the reliability of one’s intellectual virtues, one’s be-
liefs must be placed under the epistemic perspective of the knower. It is
worth noting, however, that Sosa’s distinction of animal and reflective
knowledge is «freed of the theological dependency of the Cartesian dis-
tinction and its associated infallibilism»171.
Let us examine briefly Descartes’s epistemological project172. There
are three commitments that can be attributed to Descartes. These are as fol-
lows: (1) to show that intuition and deduction are the most secure routes to
knowledge, and the mind should admit no other; (2) to attain certain
knowledge of anything by, first, proving that there is a God who is not a
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at the 48-speckle belief is not virtuous. This means that it does not “derive from a way
of forming beliefs that... in our normal situation for forming such beliefs would tend
strongly enough to give us beliefs that are safe”. But suppose that the person just looks
at a 3-speckled image and thinks “3 speckles” and just looks at a 48-speckled image and
thinks “48 speckles”. Sosa must say that the latter belief, even when it is safe, derives
from a different, and less virtuous, way of forming belief. Perhaps it does, though this is
difficult to assess». R. FELDMAN, «Foundational Justification», J. GRECO (ed.), Ernest
Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell, United Kingdom 2004, p. 51.
170. E. SOSA, «Modal and Other A Priori Epistemology», p. 7.
171. R. AUDI, «Intellectual Virtue and Epistemic Power», p. 6.
172. We will follow Sosa’s proposed interpretation of Descartes’s epistemology. It is
not our intention to provide an elaborate interpretation of Descartes’s epistemology. We are
simply highlighting the similarities between Descartes’s cognitio and scientia and Sosa’s
animal and reflective knowledge. Hence, it is not our intent to defend or to refute Sosa’s in-
terpretation of Descartes’s epistemology. Of course, to provide an elaborate explication of
Descartes’s epistemology entails a full project of its own which is beyond the scope of this
thesis. Even Sosa admits the following: «Admittedly I have done little more than to sketch
my proposed interpretation of Descartes’s epistemological project. A proper defense would
require a full textual study. My own reading inspires optimism, but the full project must
await another occasion». E. SOSA, «How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: A Lesson
from Descartes», Philosophical Studies, 85 (1997) 240. See also Sosa’s «The Mythology of
the Given», The History of Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (1997) 275-286.
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deceiver; and finally, (3) to demonstrate through appropriate reasoning
God’s existence and nondeceiving nature173.
In view of Descartes’s epistemological project, his desire is to cast
doubts concerning the unreliability of the epistemic sources. Such doubts
may derive from the fallibility of the senses, from the possibility that one
may be dreaming, from the possibility that one has fallen victim of an evil-
demon, etc. The point to make is that one has to eliminate these doubts if
one can assure himself of the reliability of his epistemic sources. In so do-
ing, it will respond nicely to Sosa’s «principle of the criterion», which
means that a high-level knowledge entails that one must be justified in tak-
ing his epistemic sources to be reliable174.
The Pyrrhonists admit that an enlightened knowledge requires
awareness of one’s epistemic doings. Only with such awareness can one
have knowledge worthy of its title. Knowledge then may be compared to a
person who discovers gold in clear light, thanks to his efforts, as opposed
to finding it in the dark through mere luck. Hence, to acquire knowledge, it
is better to proceed with adequate perspective on one’s own cognitive ef-
forts. Accordingly, Descartes makes his distinction of cognitio and scien-
tia. Sosa explains:
«Cognitio is the attaining of the truth, which can happen through one or
more layers of good luck, in the environment, in oneself, and in the adjust-
ment between the two. One might of course luck in the truth through a
mere guess that the fair dice will come up seven, and surely this does not
yet qualify as cognitio. Cognitio requires at a minimum that one attain the
truth by being appropriately constituted, and appropriately situated, to is-
sue reliable judgments on the subject matter. So constituted and situated,
one would be right on that question... Scientia requires more. It is attained
only through an adequate perspective one one’s epistemic doings. Only if
one can see how it is that one is acquiring or sustaining the belief in ques-
tion does one attain scientia. What is more, one must see that way as reli-
able, as one that would tend to lead one aright, not astray. But this is just
what is required by our Principle of the Criterion»175.
Between cognitio and scientia, what Descartes wants is a reflective,
enlightened scientia, which sets up the Cartesian Circle since reflective sci-
entia has to satisfy the principle of the criterion176. In other words, one must
be justified in taking one’s epistemic source to be reliable. The circularity
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173. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Two False Dichotomies» [Online].
174. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Plantinga’s Evolutionary Meditations», J. BIELBY (ed.), Natu-
ralism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism,
Cornell University Press, New York 2002, p. 92.
175. E. SOSA, «Two False Dichotomies» [Online].
176. E. SOSA, «How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic», p. 238.
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emerges if awareness of the reliability of the epistemic source were to be
challenged. Does the awareness of the reliability of the epistemic source
needs to be a justified awareness? Such circularity is a virtuous circle, com-
ments Sosa177. In any case, Descartes’s defense consists of having a «coher-
ence-inducing theological reasoning yielding an epistemic perspective on
himself and his world, through which he might confidently trust his facul-
ties. And these faculties must include those employed in arriving, via a priori
theological reasoning, at his perspective on himself and his world, the per-
spective that enables confidence in the reliability of those very faculties»178.
As indicated above, Sosa’s account of animal and reflective knowl-
edge closely reflects Descartes’s cognitio and scientia. Sosa explains:
«...whether one is externalist or an internalist in epistemology; and in
fact, along with Descartes, I am both. I am an externalist about animal
knowledge, as was Descartes about cognitio. And I am an internalist about
reflective knowledge, as was Descartes about scientia»179.
After having shown the similarities between Sosa’s account and that
of Descartes’s, we end our discussion by recalling that Sosa’s distinction of
animal and reflective knowledge is a consequence of his distinction of apt
belief and justified belief. Sosa says that his animal knowledge involves apt-
ness and his reflective knowledge involves not just aptness but also justifica-
tion180. Of course, more is needed to justify our explication of animal and re-
flective knowledge. Let us now discuss these two varieties of knowledge in
detail bearing in mind Descartes’s cognitio and scientia in order to appreci-
ate the similarities between Sosa and Descartes’s account of knowledge.
2.2.1. Animal and Reflective Knowledge
Knowledge that is safe and virtuous refers to Sosa’s animal knowl-
edge. «Animal knowledge is a matter of being reliably connected to the
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177. We discussed the problem of circularity already in Part III, Section 1.2.4.
178. E. SOSA, «Plantinga’s Evolutionary Meditations», p. 93. To show that the cir-
cle is in fact virtuous, Sosa explains, «We may explicate Descartes’s project by placing
it in the context of the Pyrrhonian problematic. This also helps explain why the circle is
virtuous, and how certain stages of the Cartesian project, which might seem incoherent
at first blush, are defensibly coherent in the end. (Example: the apparently incoherent
claim about needing to first prove the veracity of God.)». Ibid.
179. E. SOSA, «Reliability and the A Priori», T. GENDLER and J. HAWTHORNE (eds.),
Conceivability and Possibility I, Oxford 2002, p. 381.
180. Cfr. R. FOLEY, «The Epistemology of Sosa», Philosophical Issues, 5 (1994) 2.
See also R. FUMERTON, «Sosa’s Epistemology», Philosophical Issues, 5 (1994) 15-27.
Fumerton comments on Sosa’s epistemology, particularly on Sosa’s account of justifica-
tion and knowledge.
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world –having one’s belief be safe–»181. Such belief must be produced reli-
ably out of intellectual virtues hence one’s belief must be virtuous. Sosa
describes his animal knowledge as follows:
«One has animal knowledge about one’s environment, one’s past, and
one’s own experience if one’s judgments and beliefs about these are direct
responses to their impact –e.g., through perception or memory– with little
or no benefit of reflection or understanding»182.
Animal knowledge is a result of a direct response of one’s intellec-
tual virtues. Note that in the above description, there is little or no benefit
of reflection or understanding. However, as Sosa continues to explain his
views on animal knowledge, he states the following:
«Animal knowledge is yielded by reaction to the relevant field unaided
by reflection on the place on one’s belief and its object within one’s wider
view»183.
The above shows that Sosa puts more emphasis on the fact that
there is neither reflection nor understanding involved in animal knowledge
on the part of the knower. Suffice it to admit that to acquire animal knowl-
edge, the cognitive faculty or the intellectual virtue yielding the belief is
truth-conducive184. In other words, to yield animal knowledge, the knower
S must have the relevant faculty given the appropriate F-C pair so that S
can discern the truth and avoid error with a good ratio of success. To put it
in another way, animal knowledge is possible if the cognitive faculty in
question is working properly given the appropriate «normal» circum-
stances185. If Sosa defines knowledge in terms of intellectual virtue, then it
makes sense to admit that the acquisition of knowledge will depend upon
the circumstances in which S is in. Hence, absent «proper circumstances»,
S will not acquire animal knowledge because his intellectual virtue will not
achieve the desired results. Recall that «[a]nimal knowledge that p does
not require that the knower have an epistemic perspective on his belief that
p, a perspective from which he endorses the source of that belief, i.e., from
which he can see that source as reliably truth conducive»186. What matters
is that S must track the truth reliably without requiring S to be aware that
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181. S. COHEN, «Structure and Connection: Comments on Sosa’s Epistemology», J.
GRECO (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell, United Kingdom 2004, p. 17.
182. KIP, p. 240.
183. KIP, p. 242.
184. Cfr. KIP, p. 290.
185. The environmental aspect of intellectual virtue is well-discussed in Part II,
Section 1.2.4.
186. E. SOSA, «Human Knowledge, Animal and Reflective», p. 193.
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his belief does in fact track the truth. In any case, whether S is aware or un-
aware that his belief tracks the truth is irrelevant. It is in this sense that we
can say that Sosa’s animal knowledge is in keeping with reliabilism.
Again, if knowledge is true belief out of intellectual virtue, then the
intellectual virtue of S must be up to par with the epistemic community to
which S belongs. This is based on the idea that Sosa admits the relativity of
intellectual virtue to S’s epistemic community. If the intellectual virtue of S
does not meet the community standard, then S does not acquire animal
knowledge. As Sosa would say, a true and relevant faculty must not only
serve a particular subject, but must also serve the epistemic community.
Hence, relevant faculties must be based on an appropriate F-C pair that is
repeatable not only to individuals but also to all members of the epistemic
community. Only in such case can we say that the cognitive faculties of S
will be useful for the acquisition of knowledge187.
A simple way to describe animal knowledge is as follows:
«S has animal knowledge regarding p only if
1. p is true, and
2. S’s belief B(p) is produced by one or more intellectual virtues of
S»188.
Sosa’s reflective knowledge is a kind of knowledge that is above
animal knowledge. It can be considered as a fully human knowledge where
the belief in question is placed under the epistemic perspective of the
knower189. True enough, we acquire a certain awareness of our intellectual
aptitude and a certain sureness that we are likely to be right in our «believ-
ings» in a nonaccidental way. Thanks to our epistemic perspectivism that
the «truth of our beliefs and the coherence of our minds, which if constitut-
ed by interbelief explanatory relations is of a piece with the value of under-
standing. We want our beliefs to be true, reasonably enough, and so inte-
grated as to enable answers for our many and varied whys»190. We would
rather believe in a way that is reflectively right than believing correctly but
unreflectively so191. As such, animal knowledge implies a less cognitive so-
phistication than reflective knowledge. It does not require the knower to
know how he acquires his beliefs, whereas reflective knowledge certainly
does192. As Sosa points out, «belief amounts to reflective knowledge only if
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187. For a detailed discussion of the social aspect of intellectual virtue, see Part II,
Section 1.2.5.
188. J. GRECO, «Virtues in Epistemology», p. 291.
189. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Introduction», p. xxii.
190. E. SOSA, «Two False Dichotomies» [Online].
191. Cfr. E. SOSA, «How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic», p. 232.
192. Cfr. R. FOLEY, «The Epistemology of Sosa», p. 2.
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one can say that one does know, not just arbitrarily, but with adequate jus-
tification»193. Reflective knowledge has to depend ultimately upon the less
demanding animal knowledge since, as Sosa would say, «we cannot climb
infinite ladders of reflection»194. To have reflective knowledge, one must
have animal knowledge since an apt belief must derive from the exercise
of one’s cognitive faculties. Sosa describes reflective knowledge as fol-
lows:
«One has reflective knowledge if one’s judgment or belief manifests not
only such direct response to the fact known but also understanding of its
place in a wider whole that includes one’s belief and knowledge of it and
how these come about»195.
Reflective knowledge, as the term implies, involves reflection and
understanding. Aside from the fact that our belief must derive from the ex-
ercise of our cognitive faculties or intellectual virtue, we must also have
certain understanding as to how such belief come about. In short, reflective
knowledge pertains to those beliefs deriving from the exercise of intellec-
tual virtues with epistemic perspective. Greco describes Sosa’s reflective
knowledge as follows:
«S has reflective knowledge regarding p only if
1. p is true,
2. S’s belief B(p) is produced by one or more intellectual virtues of
S, and
3. S has a true perspective on B(p) as being produced by one or
more intellectual virtues, where such perspective is itself pro-
duced by an intellectual virtue of S»196.
Reflective knowledge is the sort of knowledge that we all should
aspire to have. It is better than animal knowledge since we will have a bet-
ter chance of being right and of being justified thanks to our «epistemic
perspective»197. As stated earlier, reflective knowledge implies that a belief
is not only apt but also justified. Aptness alone will yield us animal knowl-
edge but if combined with a coherent epistemic perspective, we can boot-
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193. E. SOSA, «Two False Dichotomies» [Online].
194. «...human reflective knowledge is most likely to depend ultimately on unre-
flective knowledge, since we cannot climb infinite ladders of reflection». KIP, p. 290.
195. KIP, p. 240.
196. J. GRECO, «Virtues in Epistemology», p. 291.
197. «Since a direct response supplement by such understanding would in general
have a better chance of being right, reflective knowledge is better justified than corre-
sponding animal knowledge». KIP, p. 240.
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strap our animal knowledge to reflective knowledge198. Sosa claims that S
attains a high-level of knowledge when S does not wonder whether he
knows, but when he can consciously say that he does know in a way that
he can defend his belief in the arena of reflection199. In cases where S un-
consciously knows that p, he is still said to have reflective knowledge if he
can defend his belief if called upon in the arena of reflection. In other
words, «[w]hen challenged in the arena, one simply reveals the support
that one’s belief already enjoyed pre-entry»200. Note that the beliefs in-
volved in these two varieties of knowledge –animal and reflective– must
be true beliefs insofar as they both derive from the exercise of intellectual
virtues. Even in cases of animal knowledge, «despite its lack of endorsing
perspective, it does involve belief that is true, well-supported, and the out-
put of reliable cognitive virtue»201. Hence, Sosa claims that the sources of
our beliefs must be at least minimally reliable to qualify as knowledge. In
combination with Sosa’s principle of exclusion (PE), he derives the «prin-
ciple of criterion» (PC), which may be described as follows:
«One knows that p and grasps (understands) the proposition that one
knows that p, only if one is justified in believing that the sources of one’s
belief that p are minimally reliable (i.e., not extremely unreliable)»202.
Sosa claims that this principle does not only apply to conscious be-
liefs, but also to implicit beliefs or unconscious beliefs. At this point, we
can see that knowledge of a minimally reliable source of our beliefs pro-
vide us with a «minimal» knowledge whereas knowledge of a highly reli-
able source of our beliefs provides us with a «maximal» knowledge. If both
require a certain awareness of the reliability of the source of one’s beliefs
–be it minimally or maximally– then we can hold that both the minimal
and the maximal knowledge pertain to Sosa’s reflective knowledge. In
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198. «The factors that confer epistemic authority on beliefs thus fall into two radi-
cally different categories: aptness, which is essentially external in character; and a co-
herent epistemic perspective, which is essentially internal. Where both are present in
harmony, we have reflective knowledge, while aptness alone yields only animal knowl-
edge». L. BONJOUR, «Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness», p. 88.
199. To be able to defend one’s belief in the arena of reflection is simply an exten-
sion of how we can understand Sosa’s principle of exclusion. Sosa writes, «Exclusion
thus implies that in order really to know something, one must be able to “defend it in the
arena of reflection”: one must be able to view oneself as meeting every condition that
one recognizes as required in order then really to know; or, alternatively and to the same
effect, one must be able to exclude justifiedly any possibility one thinks incompatible
with one’s then knowing». E. SOSA, «Two False Dichotomies», [Online].
200. Ibid.
201. E. SOSA, «Replies», J. GRECO, Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell, United
Kingdom 2004, p. 306.
202. E. SOSA, «How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic», p. 233.
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short, reflective knowledge comes in various degrees203. Reflective knowl-
edge is governed by the «principle of the criterion». Thus, «knowledge is
enhanced through justified trust in the reliability of its sources»204. The de-
gree of knowledge will depend upon our awareness of how reliable our
epistemic sources are. Since awareness is necessary for reflective knowl-
edge, it is plausible to admit that awareness may come in degrees. There
will be some situations in which our awareness will be sketchy and, at
times, it will be more precise. Sosa points out:
«Animal knowledge requires only that the belief reflect the impact of
its subject matter through the operation of a faculty or virtue. For reflective
knowledge one not only must believe out of virtue. One must also be aware
of doing so. Of course one need not know with precision and detail the rel-
evant C and F. Some grasp of them is required, however, even if it remains
sketchy and generic»205.
Sosa gives special emphasis concerning the importance of epis-
temic perspectivism in his view of reflective knowledge. Goldman points
out that «Sosa builds a strong coherence requirement into his notion of re-
flective knowledge»206. Reflective knowledge builds on animal knowledge
and what reflective knowledge adds on animal knowledge is that one’s
first order beliefs are placed under the epistemic perspective of the subject.
If unreflective knowledge is without perspectivism, then we can say that
reflective knowledge supervenes on unreflective knowledge207. No doubt,
reflective knowledge is more favorable to have than unreflective knowl-
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203. «...a whole family of “principles of the criterion”, whose unifying thread is
that they all concern the satisfaction of requirements for various degrees of knowledge.
Thus certain levels of knowledge would be compatible with one’s knowing only that the
sources of one’s belief are minimally reliable, but higher degrees would require that one
know one’s sources to be quite reliable, or highly reliable, etc.» Again, consider another
text taken from the same article which may help to provide more clarification: «Accord-
ing to this family of principles, various levels of knowledge will require various degrees
of perceived reliability in the sources of the belief constitutive of the knowledge». E.
SOSA, «Two False Dichotomies» [Online]. As we have already mentioned, we will use
the term «low-grade» and high-grade knowledge in accord with Zagzebski, in compari-
son with Sosa’s animal and reflective knowledge respectively. In so doing, we will
avoid the possibility of confusion.
204. E. SOSA, «Plantinga’s Evolutionary Meditations», p. 91. «There is a higher
state of knowledge, reflective knowledge, but one subject to our Principle of the Criteri-
on... Attaining such knowledge requires a view of ourselves –of our belief, our faculties,
and our situation– in the light of which we can see the sources of our beliefs as reliable
enough...», ibid., p. 97.
205. E. SOSA, «Virtue Perspectivism», pp. 29-30.
206. A. GOLDMAN, «Sosa on Reflective Knowledge and Virtue Perspectivism», J.
GRECO (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell, United Kingdom 2004, p. 87.
207. Cfr. KIP, p. 291.
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edge. The former is like searching for gold in daylight and discovering it
through one’s own effort as opposed to the latter which can be described as
hitting upon it in the dark through mere luck. Furthermore, the increment
of comprehensive coherence that reflective knowledge entails is a source
of epistemic worth for it is a source of certainty. Having the awareness of
the reliability of one’s cognitive faculty as truth-conducive is what renders
certainty to one’s set of beliefs208.
2.2.2. The Problem with Animal and Reflective Knowledge
In human knowledge, Sosa admits two sorts of knowledge, the ani-
mal and the reflective. Sosa tells us that sometimes knowledge can mean
the first, and sometimes the second209. Although he makes a distinction be-
tween animal and reflective, he does not mean that «the former is restricted
to lower animals, or brutes, and the latter to human beings»210. Rather,
these two sorts of knowledge pertain to humans. Sosa points out:
«Animal, unreflective knowledge is largely dependent on cognitive
modules and their deliverances. The visual deliverances of someone with
20/20 eyesight will differ in quality from those of someone nearly blind.
Reflective knowledge manifests not just modular deliverances blindly ac-
cepted, but also the assignment of proper weights to conflicting deliver-
ances, and the balance struck among them»211.
Is there a problem with Sosa’s animal knowledge? If intellectual
virtue is relative to an environment E, then animal knowledge will evident-
ly depend upon the presence of an appropriate environment E. Absent the
appropriate environment, S will not have animal knowledge of p. Similar-
ly, if intellectual virtue is relative to an epistemic community C, then S’s
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208. Cfr. E. SOSA, «How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic», p. 241. «What
favors reflective over unreflective knowledge? Reflective acquisition of knowledge is,
again, like attaining a prized objective guided by one’s own intelligence, information,
and deliberation; unreflective acquisition of knowledge is like lucking into some benefit
in the dark. The first member of each pair is distinguished from the second in being
more admirable, something that might be ascribed admiringly to the protagonist, as his
doing. And we can after all shape our cognitive practices, individually and collective,
enhancing their epistemic virtue, their effectiveness in putting us in touch with how
matters stand. [...] A further advantage of reflective knowledge is its entailed increment
of comprehensive coherence, something accepted by Descartes himself as a source of
epistemic worth, indeed as a source of certainty». E. SOSA, «Plantinga’s Evolutionary
Meditations», pp. 94-95.
209. Cfr. E. SOSA, «Human Knowledge, Animal and Reflective», p. 193.
210. E. SOSA, «Replies», p. 290.
211. Ibid., p. 291.
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cognitive faculty exercised to know that p must satisfy «community stan-
dards». If S fails to meet such standard, then S fails to have animal knowl-
edge of p.
As regards the requirement of having an adequate environment E
(F-C pair) for the proper functioning of intellectual virtues, a child will not
have animal knowledge absent the appropriate environment since a child is
incapable of making the necessary adjustment to accommodate himself in
a given situation in order to know that p. For instance, the reasoning facul-
ty of an adult has the capacity to overcome unfavorable conditions. De-
spite insufficient lighting and inadequate distance, an adult can use some
night vision devices so as to see a certain object that is far beyond the ca-
pacity of his faculty of sight. Of course, such recourse is something that
would never occur to a child given that he is incapable of using his reason-
ing faculty. Hence, a child is totally at the mercy of what is provided to
him, but that is not to say that he cannot know that p if the conditions are
favorable. Cognitive faculties will achieve their results if proper circum-
stances are present. In this sense, Sosa does have a point. If a child ac-
quires animal knowledge, it is due to the presence of an adequate F-C pair.
In addition, we can affirm that the child’s cognitive faculty exercised to
know that p does satisfy the community standard since the F-C pair must
be something repeatable not only to the child, but also to all members of a
particular group to which the child belongs. The cognitive faculty used by
the child to know that p must be a relevant faculty recognized by his epis-
temic community.
Part of the difficulty in Sosa’s account is that he does not distin-
guish cognitive faculties from intellectual virtues. Hence, an intellectual
virtue, claims Sosa, may be considered as innate or acquired212. If animal
knowledge is defined as true belief out of intellectual virtue, then how are
we supposed to understand intellectual virtues in our consideration of ani-
mal knowledge? To build an account of knowledge and justification in
terms of intellectual virtues understood also as cognitive faculties will lead
to confusion213. Consider a child’s knowledge. Can we describe his knowl-
edge as a result of the use of his cognitive faculties or as a result of the vir-
tuous use of his cognitive faculties? The former is acceptable but the latter
is not. It is unlikely for a child to have cognitive faculties that are virtuous
in the first place. A child’s way is not an adult’s way. We cannot expect a
child to make mature judgments the same way as adults. A child does pos-
sess cognitive faculties but not intellectual virtues, but that is not to say
that he is not in the process of acquiring them. Be that as it may, we cannot
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212. See Part II, Section 1.2.2.
213. We already made comments on the disadvantages of not distinguishing cogni-
tive faculties from intellectual virtues. See Part II, Section 3.
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deny a child of knowledge. He can acquire knowledge thanks to his cogni-
tive faculties.
To provide a solution to Sosa’s animal knowledge, a distinction be-
tween cognitive faculty and intellectual virtue will prove advantageous. In
so doing, it will permit us to affirm that the use of cognitive faculties will
pertain to unreflective knowledge such as that knowledge acquired by a
child. A child’s belief is apt insofar as his belief derives from the use of his
cognitive faculties hence knowledge. This prepares the way for a more
«complex» knowledge as the child matures and acquires intellectual
virtues. Moros and Umbers comment:
«The first step in knowledge is perception, but as we grow we become
more perceptive. As a person matures, so do her cognitive capacities, and
our definition of knowledge needs to be flexible enough to recognize the
increasing role of the agent and hence, motivation, in her own knowledge.
This calls for a distinction, but not a separation between faculty-based in-
puts to valid knowledge and virtue-based ones»214.
The use of intellectual virtues pertains to reflective knowledge such
as that knowledge acquired by an adult person without denying the adult
person of unreflective knowledge. An adult person can acquire both the un-
reflective and the reflective knowledge215. The point to make is that reflec-
tive knowledge requires more effort on the part of S in order to know that
p, which entails the exercise of one’s intellectual virtues. This, we believe,
will satisfy the conditions laid out by Sosa for his reflective knowledge.
Another problem with Sosa’s animal knowledge is that it is difficult
to say whether such knowledge involves the use of reason. We think that
Sosa would claim that it does not. We have already seen that Sosa’s animal
knowledge is a direct response of one’s intellectual virtue unaided by re-
flection. In addition, Sosa refers to his animal knowledge as unreflective
knowledge. Based on these premises, it is unlikely that animal knowledge
will involve any sort of reasoning216. If it is unreflective then how can such
knowledge involve reasoning? It is Sosa’s reflective knowledge that re-
quires the operation of reason217. However, as we shall see below, Sosa
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214. E. MOROS and R. UMBERS, «Distinguishing Virtues from Faculties in Virtue
Epistemology», p. 72.
215. This agrees with our claim that a justified belief is also an apt belief but an apt
belief is not necessarily a justified belief.
216. Cfr. KIP, p. 290.
217. Consider the following: «Note that no human blessed with reason has merely
animal knowledge of the sort attainable by beasts. For even when perceptual belief de-
rives as directly as it ever does from sensory stimuli, it is still relevant that one has not
perceived the signs of contrary testimony. A reason-endowed being automatically moni-
tors his background information and his sensory input for contrary evidence and auto-
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seems to claim that reasoning is involved for both animal and reflective
knowledge. Consider this:
«Reasoning is related epistemically to knowledge in two ways, corre-
sponding to the two sorts of knowledge, the reflective and the unreflective.
The latter, animal knowledge is concerned with the acquisition and sustain-
ment of apt, reliable belief, whereas the former requires the belief to be
placed also in a perspective within which it may be seen as apt... Reasoning
that provides animal knowledge is required to hold up with truth, aptness,
and justification at every lemma on which it relies essentially for the sake
of connecting its conclusion back eventually with the relevant portions of
external reality... If one is to attain animal knowledge, such reasoning must
unfold with independence from its conclusion»218.
It is important to clarify whether or not animal knowledge requires
the involvement of the faculty of reason. We accept that Sosa’s animal
knowledge puts us in contact with reality. Through one’s cognitive faculty,
one acquires «animal» knowledge of p, but what is not plausible to admit
is the intervention of the faculty of reason. Thus, Sosa is in the right direc-
tion if he is admitting that animal knowledge is unreflective. A child who is
not yet capable of using his reasoning faculty relies on his proper function-
ing cognitive faculties to acquire animal knowledge of p. A child’s reason-
ing faculty can be described as a faculty of «reason in potency.» For this
reason, we can admit the commonality of knowledge between small chil-
dren and animals. To put it in another way, the sort of knowledge common
to both higher animals and children do not go beyond the sensory order. Of
course, such claim can only be sustained if we reject the idea that reason-
ing is involved in animal knowledge. Small children and animals can ac-
quire knowledge via sensory faculties, e.g., perceptual beliefs.
In accord with contemporary thinking, an adequate account of
knowledge must take into account cases of perceptual beliefs. Hence, «be-
liefs arising from perception put us into cognitive contact with reality in a
straightforward and uncontroversial sense»219. Thanks to our cognitive fac-
ulties, it is possible for us to «know». If cognitive faculties put us in con-
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matically opts for the most coherent hypothesis even when he responds most directly to
sensory stimuli. For even when response to stimuli is most direct, if one were also to
hear or see the signs of credible contrary testimony that would change one’s response.
The beliefs of a rational animal hence would seem never to issue from unaided intro-
spection, memory, or perception. For reason is always at least a silent part on the watch
for other relevant data, a silent partner whose very silence is a contributing cause of the
belief outcome». In this occasion, we think that Sosa is speaking of reflective knowledge
and not animal knowledge. KIP, p. 240.
218. Taken from an interview with Ernest Sosa: Fall 2001. Cfr. Sosa’s homepage.
[Online] Available: http://homepage.mac.com/ernestsosa/Menu2.html.
219. L. ZAGZEBSKI, Virtues of the Mind, p. 282.
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tact with reality, then animal knowledge can be considered as «true knowl-
edge» in spite of the fact that it is not «knowledge of the truth». Faculties
possess different capacities, which permit us to capture different aspects of
reality. Seeing is to our faculty of sight, hearing is to our faculty of hearing,
etc. As we can see, if we are devoid of a certain faculty, we will not be able
to capture certain aspects of reality that pertains to the faculty in question.
Hence, a blind person is incapable of knowing aspects of reality that a
sighted person can know. We say that it is not knowledge of the truth be-
cause we are speaking of «unreflective beliefs». Sensory faculties are not
reflexive220. Therefore, they do not capture the «conformity [that] exists
between the thing seen and the image which it perceives. In every sensa-
tion there is awareness of sensing but –since the sense faculty is not reflex-
ive– this is not equivalent to knowing the conformity between the thing
and what the senses grasp about the thing»221.
In spite of the inability of small children to use their faculty of rea-
son, we think that it is inappropriate to call their knowledge animal knowl-
edge. Again, we do not deny the commonality of knowledge between
small children and animals, but we reject «animal knowledge» to avoid hu-
manizing the brutes. As we have mentioned, there is an «ontological» dif-
ference between small children and animals that requires our attention.
Small children cannot use their faculty of reason but they are «rational be-
ings» in the making, so to speak. Animals, on the other hand, are not. This
explains why small children can grow and mature intellectually and even-
tually, can acquire complex knowledge as adults do thanks to their reason-
ing faculty. Of course, animals are incapable of such kind of development
and maturity no matter how old they get. To make our point clear, it is
enough to consider that the learning capacity of a child is extremely ad-
vanced as compared to some advanced brutes. Is not a child’s capacity to
call his mother «mama» after a certain age, a manifestation of his rational
nature? If we can admit that we are rational beings, then our knowledge
can never be compared to that of animals. In other words, part of what dis-
tinguishes us from animals is our reasoning faculty hence animal knowl-
edge can never be up to par with our knowledge222. Zagzebski points out:
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220. «Como los sentidos no pueden reflexionar, es evidente que la verdad, formal-
mente, o se encuentra en ellos. Esto no quiere decir que los sentidos no se adecuen a la
realidad o que nos engañen siempre. Los sentidos pueden poseer la verdad «material-
mente», pero sin saber que la poseen». R. CORAZÓN, Filosofía del conocimiento, p. 153.
Cfr. S. Th., I, q. 16, a. 2.
221. A. LLANO, Gnoseology, p. 33.
222. «Cuando Aristóteles definió al hombre como un “ser vivo que tiene logos”,
zoon logos ejon, estaba apuntando no sólo al hecho de que el ser humano se distingue
del resto de los animales por tener una razón, sino al hecho mismo de tener lenguaje. En
efecto, el ser humano, a diferencia de los animales, es un ser que tiene lenguaje, un ser
que habla: “El hombre es el único ser vivo que tiene palabra”». F. CONESA and J. NUBIO-
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«Rationality, after all, has traditionally been understood as that proper-
ty which makes us most distinctively human. While there are no doubt oth-
er aspects of human nature that are also distinctive (e.g., human emotions),
the ability to perceive white is not one of them...»223.
As a child grows, he becomes more perceptive, his cognitive capac-
ities become more developed, and his role as an active epistemic agent,
scarcely visible as it may seem, becomes more and more noticeable. Sosa
is right for making the distinction in knowledge; hence, we accept his dis-
tinction of unreflective knowledge and reflective knowledge, but we reject
the term «animal knowledge» for reasons already mentioned. It is impor-
tant to understand that human knowledge is not animal knowledge and an-
imal knowledge is not human knowledge. To deny the «ontological» dif-
ference between humans and animals will lead to problems. Consider the
writings of Kornblith:
«First, human knowledge might seem to be different in kind from ani-
mal knowledge because it is thought that it essentially involves some sort
of social dimension, either because having propositional attitudes requires
being a user and interpreter of language..., or because having propositional
attitudes, or being justified, requires being part of a linguistic community
which engages in the social practice of giving and asking for reasons... Sec-
ondly, one might think that human knowledge requires a degree of self-re-
flectiveness unavailable to animals... Thirdly, and perhaps most important-
ly, one might think that knowledge is an interesting philosophical category
because of its normative dimension...»224.
Kornblith, comments Martin Kusch225, is not sympathetic with the
idea that there is a distinction between animal and human knowledge. For
instance, Kornblith thinks that animals also have beliefs hence it is wrong
to assume that a social dimension is required to be a believer. Kornblith
also rejects the importance of belonging to an epistemic community and he
does not agree with the idea of requiring a degree of «reflection». Conse-
quently, «Kornblith has established his general thesis according to which
there are no epistemically relevant differences between animal and human
beliefs»226. Undeniably, Sosa does not follow the same line of thinking as
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LA, Filosofía del Lenguaje, Herder, Barcelona 1999, p. 19. Aristotle writes, «...man is
the only animal who has the gift of speech». ARISTOTLE, Politics, I, 2, 1253a 10.
223. L. ZAGZEBSKI, Virtues of the Mind, pp. 278-279.
224. H. KORNBLITH, «Précis of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature», Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 71 (2005) 401.
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Kornblith. Sosa does acknowledge that we aspire for a higher-level knowl-
edge. Hence, it shows that it is important to make a distinction between an-
imal knowledge and human knowledge.
We do not deny the commonality that exists between a child’s
knowledge (or we can even mention an adult’s knowledge in this regard)
and an animal’s knowledge (e.g. the tricks that a dog can learn), but it is
important to have a proper understanding of what this «commonality» con-
sists in. The common denominator between human knowledge and animal
knowledge are those beliefs acquired which do not go beyond the sensory
order. Classical authors call this sort of knowledge sensible knowledge,
which captures external sense qualities. Hence, it does not penetrate the
essence of things227.
Consider human activities in comparison with animal activities. In
the case of sensory evaluations, animal activity belongs to the sensory or-
der since they do not possess «spiritual power». Animal activity presents
itself in their instinctive activity228. Such activity is said to be conscious
and unlearned. Klubertanz makes a good point in saying that «there is no
problem if we are careful not to humanize the brute»229. Hence, there is
nothing wrong in admitting that animals have knowledge, but we must be
careful in our understanding of what we mean by animal knowledge230.
Klubertanz writes:
«The often quoted statement, “The sheep fears the wolf and flees”, is
correct if we understand it correctly. We cannot suppose that the sheep
fears the wolf as wolf –the sheep has no notion of wolf, for this is an intel-
lectual understanding–. A chick does not follow its mother; at the right time
it follows anything that moves, including the man who brings it its food; it
might just as well follow a mechanical device...»231.
Animals have knowledge of good and evil. Such knowledge is not
to be attributed to the external sense but to the estimative power. Animals
can capture the favorable or unfavorable conditions they are in. As indicat-
ed above, a sheep can capture the imminent danger when it sees a wolf.
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Thanks to its estimative power, such an animal can evaluate the external
reality with respect to its own subjectivity232. Hence, «a sheep fears the
wolf but not a dog». Similar situations happen also to small children. They
also have a sense of danger which manifests their knowledge of good and
evil. We call this pure estimative, but not discursive estimative (or cogita-
tive sense)233. The cogitative sense may be described as «an internal sense
which is rational by participation. Since it is a sense faculty (it acts by
means of an organ) it grasps the particular; and since it is rational by par-
ticipation it can “see” the universal essence realized in the particular
thing»234. Hence, in the case of an adult, the estimative power is under ra-
tional judgment. His activity is not limited within the confinements of his
nature thanks to his reason.
As regards reflective knowledge, we have seen that what distin-
guishes reflective knowledge from animal knowledge is the presence of
epistemic perspectivism, but it seems to leave out other aspects which need
considering. The advantage of our proposal is that intellectual virtues con-
template implicitly the personal effort of the agent in acquiring such
virtues. In addition, if complemented with Zagzebskian virtues, it also un-
derlines the epistemic responsibility of the knower to acquire such knowl-
edge, not to mention the aspect of education, historical character make-up
of the agent, cultural background, the epistemic community to which the
agent belongs, etc., which are all contemplated in his effort to know that p.
Hence, it provides a more complete account of knowledge.
In any case, if we ask the question, «Is epistemic perspectivism
necessary for knowledge?» We will respond by saying that if epistemic
perspective is not necessary for an apt belief then it is not necessary for
knowledge. However, as we attempt to acquire «complex» knowledge, it
will certainly be an advantage to have some awareness of our capacities
and limitations in order to know that p. It does not mean that it is the only
important factor that we need to consider as already explained above.
Nonetheless, it is better to have epistemic perspective than not to have it.
Take, for instance, the case of Magoo who has no idea of the reliability of
his visual faculty. Surely, we would say that he is not in the position to
know that p, and if he appears to acquire «knowledge» of p, we will auto-
matically conclude that he is just lucky enough to get it right. Hence, we
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grant Sosa’s epistemic perspectivism to have an important role in the ac-
quisition of reflective knowledge, but not for animal knowledge.
On the other hand, Iranzo thinks that it is not necessary to make a
distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, as Sosa would like
to pretend. Iranzo maintains the importance of epistemic perspective to
improve pure reliabilism, but he understands epistemic perspectivism dif-
ferently from Sosa. He considers epistemic perspectivism to have two
main components: epistemic assessments and epistemic explanations235.
According to Iranzo, epistemic perspective does not necessarily require
the participation of reflexive reason. No doubt, epistemic explanations can
promote coherence of beliefs, but they do not guarantee the likelihood of
obtaining true beliefs236. Thus, considering the fact that epistemic justifica-
tion must be connected to truth, Iranzo thinks that epistemic assessments
will suffice to overcome the limitations of pure reliabilism. If coherence
provided by epistemic perspective leads to truth, comments Iranzo, then it
is the epistemic assessment that is of more importance237. If Iranzo is cor-
rect, Sosa’s distinction of animal knowledge and reflective knowledge will
not be necessary. Iranzo admits a kind of knowledge that may be compared
to Sosa’s animal knowledge. Knowledge and justification, claims Iranzo,
requires epistemic assessments only. So, Iranzo might say that knowledge
acquired by children and animals does not involve epistemic assessments
given that they are not capable of making an assessment of the reliability
of a given faculty or process based on experience. On the other hand, Iran-
zo might explain that knowledge acquired by mature adult persons will
certainly involve epistemic assessments hence they would have a tally
concerning the ratio of success of the faculty in question based on experi-
ence. The difference in epistemic quality among the adult persons will de-
pend upon the degree of precision of their epistemic assessments238. The
question now is whether we can accept Iranzo’s account of justification
and knowledge.
The point of argument of Iranzo is that epistemic assessments will
suffice to have justification and knowledge. Epistemic assessments can
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235. «Las estimaciones establecen un porcentaje (aproximado, claro está) de éxito,
esto es, un porcentaje de creencias verdaderas sobre el total de creencias obtenidas por
la facultad o procedimiento en cuestión. Las explicaciones epistémicas se superponen a
las estimaciones y proporcionan razones de por qué unas facultades o procedimientos
son exitosos y otros no». V. Iranzo, «Justificación y perspectiva epistémica», pp. 27-28.
236. Cfr. ibid., p. 22.
237. Cfr. ibid., p. 35.
238. «En definitiva, pues, con las estimaciones epistémicas podemos encajar las in-
tuiciones que resultan problemáticas para un fiabilismo puro..., y podemos también con-
servar la idea de “desarrollo epistémico”, esto es, de diferencias entre los sujetos en
cuanto a su grado de sofisticación epistémica, sin necesidad de comprometernos con
una distinción cualitativa entre conocimiento animal y conocimiento humano». Ibid.
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also augment one’s coherence of beliefs hence without involving reflexive
reason in contrast to Sosa’s claim. All that is needed is that the subject re-
fines his evaluation concerning the reliability of the faculty in question as
he acquires more experience so as to provide precision concerning his
epistemic assessments. Considerations of other subfaculty will be helpful
in the agent’s epistemic assessment. Iranzo claims that it is not necessary to
have reasons concerning as to why the faculty in question is reliable or has
a good ratio of success239. It is enough to believe that one’s faculty is reli-
able thanks to his epistemic assessment.
Beyond sensory order, it is not possible to speak of knowledge
without the participation of the reasoning faculty. Earlier, we stated that
sensory faculties must be coordinated by the reasoning faculty. Hence, it is
difficult to see how one can build an adequate account of knowledge with-
out considering the role of the faculty of reason. For instance, consider the
role of experience in epistemic assessments maintained by Iranzo. Does
epistemic assessment not involve the reasoning faculty? How can one
make assessments concerning the reliability of a certain faculty without
reasoning? Furthermore, it is undeniable that experience helps in the for-
mation and sustenance of beliefs. Indeed, experience is helpful because
when one acquires experience, one learns what he ought to do and what he
ought not to do. In other words, the subject learns to make the necessary
adjustments, which in this case, he learns to refine his epistemic assess-
ments concerning his capacities and possibilities to obtain true beliefs giv-
en his acquired experience. Note that it is through the reasoning faculty
that the epistemic agent learns what adjustments he needs to make so as to
refine his epistemic assessments. It is not something that the agent does
unreflectively. Consequently, we argue that building an account of justifi-
cation and knowledge without considering the role of the faculty of reason
is not plausible. We must take into account the role of the faculty of reason
in knowledge and justification. Consequently, we agree with Sosa that it is
necessary to make a distinction of knowledge in order to explain the differ-
ence in the epistemic quality between knowledge acquired by children/ani-
mals and knowledge acquired by mature adult persons.
Lastly, Iranzo claims that it is not clear that coherence of beliefs via
reflection and perspective promotes true beliefs240. We can have a good
epistemic assessment with a bad epistemic explanation. As such, Iranzo
thinks that we can still have justification and knowledge in spite of having
poor explanations as to the «whys» of the reliability of our cognitive facul-
ties. Hence, reflexive reason is not necessary and it does not guarantee an
increase in the amount of truth. There is no pretext, however, of infallibili-
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ty in Sosa’s account241. Sosa does not admit super-justification and super-
knowledge. For this reason, we can admit that the possibility of error is
compatible with Sosa’s epistemic perspectivism. As we have seen earlier,
coherence of beliefs is acquired by reasoning well. No doubt, one can ad-
mit that coherence must be truth-conducive. Any epistemic agent who can
defend his beliefs in the arena of reflection would certainly have a better
chance of possessing true beliefs than false beliefs. As Sosa would say, to
defend one’s belief is to be «able to view oneself as meeting every condi-
tion that one recognizes as required in order then really to know; or, alter-
natively and to the same effect, one must be able to exclude justifiedly any
possibility one thinks incompatible with one’s then knowing»242. It is cer-
tain that we prefer to believe reflectively than unreflectively.
To end our discussion regarding the viability of Sosa’s animal and
reflective knowledge, we conclude that it is necessary to make the distinc-
tion between animal and reflective knowledge. It highlights the difference
between what small children and animals can know from that of mature
adult persons. The difference between them is the use of the faculty of rea-
son in acquiring knowledge. This provides emphasis that high epistemic
quality in knowledge necessitates the involvement of the reasoning faculty.
We reject «animal knowledge» because it creates confusion. Either it will
lead to humanizing the brutes or it may lead to reducing human knowledge
to animal knowledge. Either way would be a mistake. Regardless of the in-
ability of a child to acquire «reflective» knowledge, the child’s knowledge
is still «human knowledge» although unreflective. It is not just a question
of semantics that we reject Sosa’s animal knowledge, but above all, we re-
ject it because there is an «ontological» difference between a child and an
animal. A child is a «rational being» in the making whereas an animal is
not. We suggest that we distinguish human knowledge into unreflective
and reflective knowledge to show the important role of the reasoning facul-
ty in knowledge. Thus, there is continuity –not a separation– between un-
reflective and reflective knowledge in which unreflective knowledge pre-
pares the way for reflective knowledge. A simple way to describe the
distinction is to admit that one may acquire knowledge either without rea-
soning or with reasoning.
As for reflective knowledge, we accept that epistemic perspec-
tivism does have an important part to play in the acquisition of knowledge.
Comprehensive coherence does help. As Sosa would say, «we would pre-
fer that our minds not house a clutter of mere facts sitting there loose from
one another»243. What we want is to have a set of beliefs that will very well
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hang together. As argued before, the advantage of epistemic perspectivism
is that it puts S in touch with the reality in a more effective way hence a
source of certainty. However, it is not the only important factor to consider.
If we admit that it is the person «who knows» and that it is the person who
is the «seat of justification», then other factors that may influence a person
in his acquisition of knowledge need to be considered. Aside from the in-
tellectual virtues, the moral virtues and the personal efforts that S employs
to acquire these virtues, factors such as history, geography, education, cul-
tural, social, religion, natural endowments, and other relevant factors will
certainly influence S in his acquisition of knowledge244.
We think that our suggestion continues to be in keeping with con-
temporary thinking and it will accommodate nicely the knowledge that a
child and an adult possess; hence providing us with an adequate account of
knowledge. We conclude that for rational beings, it is only proper to speak
of «human knowledge», a kind of knowledge that may be unreflective or
reflective.
2.3. A Proposed Account of Knowledge
In our proposed account of knowledge, we shall focus our attention
on the two distinct levels that we suggested earlier: the unreflective and the
reflective knowledge. We shall provide an adequate explication of these
two distinctions of knowledge. In doing so, we shall make use of our dis-
tinction of cognitive faculties and intellectual virtues to explain unreflec-
tive and reflective knowledge respectively245. It is important to stress that
such distinction will not follow Sosa’s view in its entirety. Of course, there
will be aspects of Sosa’s view, which we will integrate in our proposal. We
shall make some adjustments with the intent of providing a more adequate
account of knowledge. We think that this is only possible if we include
some aspects from Zagzebski’s account in our new version. This will pro-
vide us with a better way of dealing with knowledge of «high-level»,
which is not possible with Sosa’s account. In the end, our proposed ac-
count will be able to satisfy both the «low end» and the «high end» of
knowledge.
Unreflective and reflective knowledge parallel the classical distinc-
tion of sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge, which, in the final
analysis, is a distinction between knowledge «without reasoning» and
«with reasoning» respectively. However, it is worth pointing out that there
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is «a long list of philosophers [who] have been unwilling or at least hesi-
tant, to ascribe knowledge to states that engage the senses without signifi-
cant contribution from the intellect. This is not to deny that there can be
simple beliefs based on perception, such as «This is a white piece of pa-
per», which are good enough to be states of knowing, but the dominant
view in philosophical history has been that such states are states of knowl-
edge only if they are based on more than sensory data»246. It is only through
our reasoning faculty that we know. One does not know when one is asleep
despite the fact that one may feel the coldness or the warmness of the air247.
For instance, when we say that «this paper is white», are we not saying the
truth that the paper is white? In the classical sense, when one captures the
conformity of truth, the operation of the intellect is duly implied248. As we
can see, this is not in accord with the contemporary thinking since the ma-
jority of contemporary philosophers do think that perceptual beliefs are
cases of knowledge. It is for this reason that they claim that knowledge of
small children and animals are true knowledge in spite of the fact that it is
not knowledge of the truth.
Nonetheless, we think that there are positive insights we can draw
from the classical distinction of sense knowledge and intellectual knowl-
edge such as the role of sense faculties and reasoning faculty in the acqui-
sition of knowledge. In addition, it will provide us with a better under-
standing as regards the relation between unreflective and reflective
knowledge by considering the continuity that exists between sense knowl-
edge and intellectual knowledge. In the same manner that intellectual
knowledge depends on sense knowledge, we can also say that reflective
knowledge depends on unreflective knowledge. In addition, intellectual
knowledge puts emphasis on the active role of the epistemic agent in
knowing. We receive information from our sensory faculties, but it is the
person who does the knowing and does so through his reasoning faculty.
Intellectual knowledge underlines the radical difference between human
knowledge and animal knowledge. Hence, it helps to avoid a «reduction-
ist» view of human knowledge. In this section, we shall first consider the
role of cognitive faculties and thereafter, we shall examine the role of intel-
lectual virtues in knowledge. Lastly, we shall end this section with our pro-
posed account of knowledge. As we have seen earlier, the role of cognitive
faculties pertains to knowledge of the unreflective and the role of intellec-
tual virtues pertains to knowledge of the reflective. We shall argue that the
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sort of knowledge that is proper to us humans is what we may call human
knowledge, which admits two levels of knowledge: the unreflective knowl-
edge and the reflective knowledge. Given that our reasoning faculty can al-
ways «know» more, we admit that knowledge comes in degrees. It is true
that no human being possesses absolute knowledge, but that is not to say
that one cannot advance in knowledge. Indeed, there is a correlation be-
tween one’s knowledge and one’s good intellectual character. The more in-
tellectually virtuous a person is, the more he will be in the position to know
p hence such person can advance more in his knowledge of p. The account
of knowledge that we are suggesting can be shown as follows:
Un reflective Knowledge
Human Knowledge Simple knowledge
Reflective Knowledge
Complex knowledge
2.3.1. Faculties and Unreflective Knowledge
In our present discussion, we shall focus our attention on the low
end of knowledge. A typical example that falls under this category is that
knowledge of small children and animals. However, when we speak of this
sort of knowledge, what exactly do we mean? What is involved in acquir-
ing knowledge at the low end of the scale? Sosa tells us that unreflective
knowledge is acquired through the exercise of one’s cognitive faculties.
Hence, perceptual beliefs and memory beliefs would be considered as par-
adigms of this sort of knowledge. «[S]uch beliefs are formed in an uncon-
scious manner without the agency of the agent»249, comments Zagzebski.
To put it in another way, unreflective knowledge is acquired by the knower
without the intervention of the faculty of reason. Thus, the passive nature
of the agent is duly implied. As argued earlier, it is only in this sense that
we can admit the commonality of knowledge between small children and
animals; otherwise, it will be difficult to sustain such commonality if small
children were to acquire unreflective knowledge through their reasoning
faculty, even if only a minimal amount of reasoning were involved. As
such, acquiring unreflective knowledge through the use of cognitive facul-
ties entails the use of external senses and internal senses only. In short, un-
reflective knowledge is acquired via sense faculties (or cognitive sensi-
bles). In the classical sense, one may describe such knowledge as sense
knowledge, which –traditionally speaking– was not considered as true
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knowledge250. However, in the contemporary context, philosophers are not
hesitant to think of perceptual beliefs as cases of knowledge. Given that
sense faculties do put us in contact with reality, beliefs arising from such
faculties are regarded as cases of true knowledge251. It is undeniable that
sense faculties do not bring about knowledge of the truth, but they can cer-
tain y provide us with knowledge since knowledge begins with sense fac-
ulties.
What we need to highlight is that unreflective knowledge is essen-
tial to human knowledge. It is not possible to provide a complete account
of human knowledge without its consideration. The use of sense faculties
makes it possible to acquire reflective knowledge. Thus, Sosa and Gold-
man are correct in saying that beliefs derive from one’s cognitive faculties.
We say that there is a white board in front of us because we can see that
there is. Thanks to our faculty of sight, it is possible for us to have such be-
liefs252. The problem with Sosa and Goldman’s view is the lack of demar-
cation regarding the relevant cognitive faculties involved in knowing. Ba-
sically, both admit that any faculty «beneath the skin» may be considered
as cognitive faculties as long as they are truth-conducive. In addition, there
is no mention of how such cognitive faculties are interrelated. It is impor-
tant to consider these aspects in order to understand unreflective knowl-
edge adequately253.
Let us now examine the role of sense faculties in the acquisition of
unreflective knowledge. The first thing to notice about sense faculties is
that they are not virtues; hence, these faculties are not normative. They
function accordingly without normativity. Faculties are innate powers
which we are endowed with. We need not determine the relevant faculties
for knowing since our very own nature has already determined that for us.
Thus, the relevant faculties for unreflective knowledge are as follows:
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250. This is the main reason why we think that it is more appropriate to use Sosa’s
«unreflective knowledge» instead of using «sense knowledge» to describe that the
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Knowledge, strictly speaking, is acquired when the faculty of the intellect is involved,
which in classical term is referred to as «intellectual knowledge».
251. Sense knowledge is said to be aspectual because our sensory faculties can
only capture aspects of reality. Nevertheless, we consider sense knowledge as true
knowledge insofar as our sensory faculties connect us to the world. If we were to have
another faculty, then it is obvious that we would have another way of knowing a differ-
ent aspect of reality depending on what this added faculty can provide us. Cfr. R.
CORAZÓN, Filosofía del conocimiento, pp. 71-72.
252. «Como el conocimiento es la apertura y aprehensión de la realidad por parte
del sujeto, es preciso que haya un punto de encuentro entre la realidad y el sujeto que
conoce. Todo conocimiento (sensitivo o intelectual) debe partir de la sensibilidad exter-
na... Pues bien, el punto de contacto entre la realidad material y el sujeto cognoscente se
da en los sentidos externos». J. A. CUADRADO, Antropología filosófica, p. 53.
253. See Part II, Section 3.1.
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touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight, common sense, imagination, memory
and cogitation; of course, we shall reserve the faculty of intellect for re-
flective knowledge. We need to carry out different operations which entail
different faculties to connect us with the world since one single faculty will
not suffice to do it. As we have seen earlier, each faculty performs a certain
operation which is distinct from the other faculties. As such, the different
faculties that we have must be unified and interrelated in order to acquire
unreflective knowledge. Let us see how our external senses can work for
us. Aristotle writes:
«...we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself
the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece
of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold»254.
As indicated above, our external senses receive the sensible forms
of things. Hence, to sense is to know and to know is to know something.
This «something» is the object captured by the external sense, which is the
sensible form. In the act of sensing, the object is given insofar as it is cap-
tured by the particular sense in question. Hence, the relation between the
act-object does not admit divorce255. Our external senses are actualized if
sensible things are present. In other words, our external senses receive a
certain stimulus and react to such stimulation. Thus, we can say that such
faculties are not totally passive. When sensible forms are received by these
faculties, a transition from potency to act takes place. We say that we see
when there is light, we hear when there is a sound, etc., but to see implies
seeing and to hear implies hearing. If knowledge is an immanent opera-
tion, as we admit earlier, then it follows that the act of sensing is also an
immanent operation256. External senses provide us with knowledge of the
singulars. We only see when there is something to see, we only hear when
there is something to hear, etc. Aquinas points out:
«Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a cor-
poreal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter;
hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive
power in the soul, called the intellect...»257.
Aside from the fact that external senses capture individual things,
external senses only «know» sensible things if they are present. As men-
tioned already, it is not possible to see if there is nothing to see or to hear
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if there is nothing to hear. If our external senses receive the sensible forms
of things, it is only possible to do so because physical objects are present.
Since external senses are forms of the organs which receive the stimulus,
sensation then implies a relation between «form and form» and not «ma-
terial and form»258. This makes sense since a sensible faculty is not re-
duced to its organ, but has the capacity to perform a certain operation259.
Finally, our external senses do not trick us. There is conformity between
the sensible thing and what our external senses grasp about the sensible
thing. Of course, we are not affirming that our external senses know such
conformity. Sense faculties do not know the conformity because it is not
reflexive260. Hence, we grant Sosa for claiming that unreflective knowl-
edge is a matter of reliably being connected to the world since it is unde-
niable that sense faculties do put us in touch with reality. Our external
senses track the truth261. What our external senses have to report is not
right by accident.
Despite the importance of external senses in knowledge insofar as it
puts us in contact with reality, we realize that external senses are not
enough to explain unreflective knowledge. External senses only capture a
certain aspect of reality according to its capacity. They do not capture the
thing itself but only a certain aspect of it such as colours, sounds, smell,
etc. This forces us to go beyond what our external senses can grasp. We
also need to rely on our internal senses which conserve and coordinate
those sensations captured by our external senses. Thanks to our internal
senses, we are not only capable of grasping external present realities, but
also external «absent» realities. Hence, internal senses enable us to search
for these absent realities in a knowing way262. Sensations captured by our
external senses are unified in the subject, which enables the subject to cap-
ture the reality as a whole. Since sensations are unified in the subject that
grasps the reality, there is an interrelation between our sense faculties for
which some faculties are coordinators of other inferior faculties. Aquinas
nicely explains the interrelation and coordination of our sense faculties,
comments Llano:
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258. Cfr. R. CORAZÓN, Filosofía del conocimiento, p. 64.
259. Cfr. J. F. SELLÉS, Curso breve de teoría del conocimiento, p. 60. See also ARIS-
TOTLE, On the Soul, II, 12, 424a 24-28.
260. Cfr. A. LLANO, Gnoseology, p. 33 «In both sense knowledge and in simple ap-
prehension there is conformity between the knowing faculty and the thing». Ibid., p. 34.
261. «In a normal person proper perception is habitual, and sense error is rare. The
senses, of themselves, are always truth. They can only make mistakes per accidens
about common sensibles, and then only the organic malfunction in regard to proper sen-
sibles». De Veritate, q. 1, a. 11. Cited by A. LLANO, Gnoseology, p. 78.
262. Cfr. E. MOROS and R. UMBERS, «Distinguishing Virtues from Faculties in Virtue
Epistemology», p. 64.
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«Aquinas... maintained that repeated sensations receive a first sense
structuring in the perception of the common sense, which integrates the
data brought by the external sense (common and proper sensibles). This
perception is further integrated and structured by the imagination and the
memory: from many sensations the image is formed, from many images
the memory. Finally, the height of sense perception takes place through the
cogitative sense, which produces an experience, the act of comparatively
apprehending singular perceptions received in memory»263.
The interrelation and coordination of sense faculties happens within
the subject. This shows that the subject who possesses the faculties is the
final coordinator of all. Faculties will function accordingly in virtue of
their capacities, but we need a subject who has to govern these faculties264.
Of course, we cannot limit ourselves in our consideration of sense faculties
to explain human knowledge fully. We still have yet to explain the role of
the faculty of reason. Hence, we now turn to our reflective knowledge.
Before we discuss reflective knowledge, it is important to see the
continuity between unreflective and reflective knowledge. We can under-
stand such continuity if we consider the link between sense knowledge and
intellectual knowledge. Aquinas writes:
«In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that in-
tellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible knowledge: and,
because sense has singular and individual things for its object, and intellect
has the universal for its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former
comes before our knowledge of the latter... knowledge of the singular and
individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal; as sen-
sible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge»265.
As indicated above, it makes sense to claim that sensible knowledge
is prior to intellectual knowledge since our faculty of reason has to rely on
the information provided by our sense faculties. Sensible knowledge is im-
portant since intellectual knowledge begins with sensible knowledge.
2.3.2. Virtues and Reflective Knowledge
Sosa tells us that reflective knowledge is acquired via cognitive fac-
ulties with epistemic perspective. To place our first order beliefs in epis-
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263. A. LLANO, Gnoseology, p. 123.
264. «... we need a subject who... is the final coordinator of these faculties... It is
the rational (or irrational) agent who freely governs her cognitive faculties as the head
of that hierarchy, subject, of course, to the constraints and possibilities of her cognitive
powers». E. MOROS and R. UMBERS, Distinguishing Virtues from Faculties in Virtue
Epistemology», pp. 64-65.
265. S. Th., I, q. 85, a. 3.
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temic perspective entails that we will have a reason to think that such be-
liefs are true. The truth of our beliefs is a just consequence of the reliabili-
ty of the faculty that produces them for which we are aware. The internal
coherence of our beliefs requires the operation of reason. Thus, Sosa is
right for maintaining that reflective knowledge requires the intervention of
the faculty of reason, which resembles the intellectual knowledge viewed
by classical authors. We realize that our sensory faculties will not bring us
far. We need to resort to our faculty of reason to make sense of whatever
our sensory faculties have to report. This shows that there is continuity be-
tween the faculty of reason and the sensory faculties. From senses to rea-
son, we say that our sensory faculties prepare the way for the faculty of
reason in order to capture the sensible thing itself thanks to the information
they provide266. Our faculty of reason provides us with knowledge of the
nature of sensible things. Thus, we acquire «knowledge of the truth» since
our faculty of reason knows the conformity between our knowing faculties
and the sensible thing itself. This is possible because such faculty is reflex-
ive. From reason to senses, we can say that the faculty of reason guides the
sensory faculties in order to acquire «knowledge of the singulars»267. We
think that it is central to understand the continuity between the sensory fac-
ulties and the faculty of reason because it also underlines the continuity be-
tween our unreflective knowledge and reflective knowledge. As we can
see, there are two things that our faculty of reason does. First, it guides our
sensory faculties and second, it provides us with knowledge of the truth.
The key idea to bear in mind in reflective knowledge is the role of our fac-
ulty of reason in intellectual virtues and consequently, in knowledge.
In unreflective knowledge, we admit that it is based on sensory fac-
ulties without the agency of the agent. In other words, it does not require
the agent to decide how to make use of his sensory faculties. It is for this
reason that we admit that small children and animals have unreflective
knowledge. This is the view of Sosa and his companions. However, we re-
alize that such a view is not enough since we also need to consider the
proper use that the agent may choose to make of his cognitive faculties.
Sosa admits that «no human blessed with reason has merely animal knowl-
edge»268. The moment that we admit the active role of the agent in his
knowing, we are forced to consider his reasoning faculty and his decisions
or choices in using his cognitive faculties. It follows that it is possible for
the agent to use his cognitive faculties properly or improperly. This is how
intellectual virtues are ingrained in the epistemic agent. The moment that
A NEW APPROACH TO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IN SOSA’S VIRTUE... 193
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present to the intellect through immaterial species». A. LLANO, Gnoseology, p. 133.
267. Cfr. De Veritate, q. 10, a. 5. Cited by A. LLANO, Gnoseology, p. 126.
268. E. SOSA, «Virtue Perspectivism», p. 30.
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the epistemic agent puts to use his cognitive faculties in the virtuous man-
ner, he is said to be on his way to becoming an intellectually virtuous
agent. Virtues can make us a better cognitive agent269. He can bootstrap his
unreflective knowledge to reflective knowledge thanks to the virtuous use
of his reasoning faculty, guiding the rest of his sensory faculties in obtain-
ing knowledge of the truth.
Is it necessary to have intellectual virtues in knowing? We have al-
ready shown that unreflective knowledge does not require the agent to be
intellectually virtuous, but we admit that it is undeniably necessary for re-
flective knowledge. The definition of knowledge given by Moros and Um-
bers will show that it is. We think that a minimal amount of virtuousness in
the use of one’s cognitive faculties is necessary in order to have reflective
knowledge of p since an improper use of one’s cognitive faculties will lead
us to error. As it happens, no one would say that intellectual vices would
help us in the pursuit of truth. Moros and Umbers define knowledge thus:
«S knows p if, and only if, S forms the belief p from an epistemically
virtuous use of S’s cognitive faculties»270.
A faculty is an operative power that produces a certain effect
whereas a virtue is a disposition that leads the agent to achieve such an ef-
fect. Virtues lead S to produce the ability of the faculty in question in a re-
liable way. If S is devoid of intellectual virtues, then the success compo-
nent in knowing that p will be minimal and therefore, one will be prone to
having «knowledge of p» in an accidental way. The stable disposition of
the subject is not something that just comes about unexpectedly; rather, it
is something that the knowing subject acquires through the successful rep-
etition of applying one’s faculties in the acquisition of reflective knowl-
edge. If «the true and the false are not in things but in the mind»271, then it
is central that the agent learns to use his reasoning faculty and to guide his
sensory faculties in a virtuous manner. If one’s cognitive faculties are
properly employed in his knowing that p, then one becomes more reliable
in knowing that p insofar as one becomes a more intellectually virtuous
agent. The virtuous use of our reasoning faculty is what provides reliabili-
ty of our cognitive faculties. If the reasoning faculty is in the «driver’s
seat», so to speak, which directs the rest of our cognitive faculties then the
reasoning faculty must learn how to direct the rest of the cognitive facul-
ties properly. In consequence, knowledge is acquired through the success-
ful and proper use of one’s cognitive faculties.
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269. E. MOROS and R. UMBERS, «Distinguishing Virtues from Faculties in Virtue
Epistemology», p. 69.
270. Ibid., p. 72.
271. A. LLANO, Gnoseology, p. 33. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, V, 4, 1027b 25-28.
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Aquinas writes:
«For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the
knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the
knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its
own nature»272.
According to our nature, we are endowed with different cognitive
faculties in order to connect us with the world. Each of our faculty per-
forms its task in order to grasp a certain aspect of reality. The different as-
pects captured by our cognitive faculties are unified in the person who
does the knowing. Thanks to his reasoning faculty, he makes something
out of what our sensory faculties provide and sees it as a complete picture.
Of course, our reasoning faculty has the power to transcend the informa-
tion that our sensory faculties provide. For this, Aristotle reminds us that
our «soul is in a way all existing things»273. From what Aquinas is telling
us, it shows that sensory faculties and reasoning faculty are indispensable
in human knowledge. Knowledge will not be possible without cognitive
faculties. Likewise, it is equally important to note that without the person
who does the knowing, knowledge will not be possible either, be it unre-
flective or reflective knowledge274. As such, a computer –which is capable
of providing ample information and can calculate any mathematical prob-
lems in a matter of seconds, faster than any capable person– can never be
compared to any human person, be it on the intellectual level or on the
sensory level, precisely because a human person is capable of knowledge
whereas computers are not 275. The point to make is that it is the person
who possesses intellectual virtues and knowledge. For this reason, he
must put efforts not only into acquiring intellectual virtues, but also in
employing such intellectual virtues as to acquire reflective knowledge. An
anthropological conception of knowledge maintains that «neither the
senses nor the intellect know, but rather that man knows by means of
these faculties»276. Moros and Umbers are right in saying that the consid-
eration of the role of cognitive faculties in knowledge should never be
isolated from the subject277. Indeed the subject must satisfy certain condi-
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272. S. Th., I, q. 12, a. 4.
273. ARISTOTLE, On the Soul, III, 8, 431b 21.
274. «...sin alguien que conozca, sin personas, no hay conocimiento en sentido es-
tricto, por muchas información que se procese». J. A. GONZÁLEZ, Teoría del
conocimiento humano, p. 19.
275. Cfr. ibid., p. 21.
276. A. LLANO, Gnoseology, p. 38.
277. Cfr. E. MOROS and R. UMBERS, «Distinguishing Virtues and Faculties in Virtue
Epistemology», p. 78.
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tions in order to acquire intellectual virtues and, in turn, through the exer-
cise of one’s intellectual virtues will acquire knowledge.
Knowledge comes in degrees. One thing is to acquire reflective
knowledge, but another thing is to advance in one’s reflective knowledge.
It is undeniable that we can always know more278. No doubt we have no ab-
solute knowledge hence our reasoning faculty is not absolutely infinite, but
that is not to say that it is not operatively infinite279. We can never exhaust
our capacity to know. We believe that it is worth considering this phenom-
enon, which is an essential part of our knowledge of knowledge. There are
people who can know more than others can. It is undeniable that there is a
difference of epistemic quality in the knowledge acquired by a person who
knows more such as in the field of science, philosophy, art, etc., as com-
pared to another person who does not. We suggest that we describe the dif-
ferences in the degrees of knowledge acquired by these persons as complex
and simple knowledge respectively. Obviously, complex knowledge will
require more effort on the part of the agent in order to be proficient in such
fields. The question is what are the conditions involved in acquiring com-
plex knowledge and simple knowledge.
Perhaps, we may describe simple knowledge as beliefs deriving
from the virtuous use of one’s cognitive faculties in a minimal degree. In
other words, to acquire simple knowledge, one must be minimally intellec-
tually virtuous and must minimally use his reasoning faculty in a coherent
way. This is based on the assumption that knowledge depends upon the
epistemic virtuousness of the person who knows. It is a given fact that
there are people who are less intellectually virtuous than others are. Thus,
they are only capable of knowing matters that are cases of simple knowl-
edge. This implies a minimal amount of effort on the part of the person in
order to know that p. In any case, simple knowledge is still preferable than
unreflective knowledge since small children and animals have no aware-
ness of their knowledge. They know without knowing. They are not aware
of what they know. On the other hand, simple knowledge implies an
awareness of the information provided by sensory faculties as opposed to
unreflective knowledge where such awareness is not possible280. We may
say that Sosa’s reflective knowledge (via cognitive faculties with epistemic
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278. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, On the Soul, III, 5, 430a 14-15.
279. Cfr. J. A. GONZÁLEZ, Teoría del conocimiento humano, p. 45.
280. González claims that the first act of the human intelligence is the «con-
science» (we think that we can also use the word «awareness» to imply the same thing).
Gonzáles writes, «El primer acto de la inteligencia humana es la conciencia. La con-
ciencia es el enterarse de algo: de que llueve, de que ahí delante hay una silla, de que me
duele la muela o de que alguien me pregunta la hora. Conciencia, por tanto, llamamos
aquí a la captación de información, al enterarse de algo, a la recepción de una noticia».
Ibid., p. 23.
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perspective) can be considered as simple knowledge. To borrow Sosa’s
words, simple knowledge is said to be as follows:
«[Simple] knowledge requires not only internal justification or coher-
ence or rationality, but also external warrant or aptness. We must be both in
good internal order and in appropriate relation to the external world»281.
Complex knowledge may be regarded as a high-grade knowledge,
understood in a somewhat similar way to Zagzebski’s account of knowl-
edge282. Hence, it demands more effort on the part of the agent in order to
acquire such knowledge. This entails that the agent must exercise his in-
tellectual virtues to a higher degree if he is to be successful in obtaining
this sort of knowledge, such as knowledge of science, philosophy, arts,
etc. Aside from Sosean virtues, Zagzebskian virtues would certainly be an
asset (virtues of open-mindedness, intellectual humility, etc.283). Knowl-
edge entails personal freedom. We have seen that our cognitive faculties
depend upon how the agent decides to make use of them. Hence, we can
say that cognitive faculties are subject to our personal freedom. We decide
not only how to make use of our cognitive faculties, but we also decide
what sort of knowledge we would like to acquire and how to go about ac-
quiring it. We need to be epistemically responsible in order to put those
necessary means that will effectively lead us to obtain our target knowl-
edge. In this sense, Zagzebski is right in affirming that one needs to be
properly motivated284. To be properly motivated entails that one will guide
his actions in the pursuit of acquiring the target knowledge. He will evi-
dently employ his intellectual virtues and he will fulfill his duty both
morally and intellectually so as to be successful in attaining his goal. Such
a person will try to be open-minded, to be conscientious, etc. aside from
reasoning well and using his cognitive faculties in a proper manner. In
short, one will proceed in a way that will manifest that he is a person with
phronesis. Of course, we should not disregard other factors such as: culture,
education, community, family, religion, natural endowments, etc., which
undoubtedly may contribute to our knowledge of complex matters. Moros
and Umbers comment:
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281. E. SOSA, «Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles», p. 284.
282. «The definition of knowledge I have given is fairly rigorous. It requires the
knower to have an intellectually virtuous motivation in the disposition to desire truth,
and this disposition must give rise to conscious and voluntary acts in the process leading
up to the acquisition of true belief... and the knower must successfully reach the truth
through the operation of this motivation and those acts. Such a definition has an advan-
tage on the high end of knowledge...» L. ZAGZEBSKI, Virtues of the Mind, p. 273.
283. Cfr. ibid., p. 114.
284. See Part II, Section 2.3.1.
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«... moral virtues can very well aid somebody in the exercise of gather-
ing knowledge (being conscientious, paying attention in class, etc.), but the
knowing act itself pertains to the cognitive order and not to the volitional
order of the will or emotions with which it might be in association and by
which it may be influenced»285.
We can clearly appreciate the importance of prudence in knowl-
edge. A prudent person knows how much evidence is needed in order to
support his beliefs, he knows how to conduct his investigations so as to at-
tain his objectives, he knows in a given situation whether it is better to be
open-minded to the ideas of others or to persevere in one’s beliefs, etc.286.
Of course, prudence requires experience. Aristotle tells us that prudence is
not found in young people287. Finally, we have seen earlier that it is not
possible to be prudent without being morally virtuous hence it follows that
moral virtues do help in one’s acquisition of complex knowledge. Indeed,
«we cannot be intelligent without being good»288.
To end our discussion, we note in passing that the effort of acquir-
ing complex knowledge will eventually lead S into acquiring wisdom,
which can be considered as the perfection of human knowledge since it en-
ables S to orient himself towards his ultimate end289. Aquinas writes:
«[W]isdom, which considers the highest causes... it rightly judges all
things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal
judgment that is not based on the first causes»290.
In acquiring wisdom, which has to do with speculative truths such
as those dealing with God’s nature, we are enabled to know that we depend
on God and consequently, that our ultimate end is God. Hence, it seeks
knowledge of ultimate significance291. As such, Aquinas considers wisdom
to be of the highest place292.
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285. E. MOROS and R. UMBERS, «Distinguishing Virtues from Faculties in Virtue
Epistemology», p. 71.
286. Zagzebski provides a detailed explication as regards her proposal on the func-
tion of phronesis. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, Virtues of the Mind, pp. 219-231.
287. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, VI, 8, 1142a 21.
288. Ibid., VI, 12, 1144a 36.
289. «La sabiduría es la perfección del conocimiento humano, pues hace que el
hombre pueda vivir como tal, es decir, orientándose hacia la trascendencia y evitando lo
que le aparte de su fin último». R. CORAZÓN, Filosofía del conocimiento, p. 107.
290. S. Th., I-II, q. 57, a. 2.
291. Cfr. R. CORAZÓN, Filosofía del conocimiento, p. 107. See also W. J. WOOD,
Epistemology, pp. 66-70.
292. «...that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and
both of these depend on wisdom as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath
itself both understanding, and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science,
and of the principles on which they are based».S. Th., I-II, q. 57, a. 2.
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2.3.3. Knowledge, a New Perspective
The important insight we can draw from Sosa’s account of knowl-
edge is his distinction of animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We
agree that we must recognize the differences in epistemic quality that exist
between the knowledge acquired by small children and mature adult per-
sons. To recognize such distinction entails that we must be able to provide
an account of knowledge that will both accommodate the low-end and the
high-end of the scale which knowledge admits. Thus, we suggest unreflec-
tive knowledge and reflective knowledge. The description we provided for
both sorts of knowledge fits nicely with our distinction of cognitive facul-
ties and intellectual virtues. Unreflective knowledge is that of beliefs ac-
quired through the exercise of cognitive faculties and reflective knowledge
is that of beliefs acquired through the exercise of intellectual virtues. As
we can see, our account of knowledge satisfies the positive insights of
foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism. We satisfy the foundational-
ist’s view since our knowledge derived its foundation from our cognitive
faculties. We meet the coherentist’s condition since by reasoning well, our
minds are not a clutter of mere facts, Sosa would say. Lastly, we keep the
reliabilist’s insight since our cognitive faculties do connect us with the
world reliably. Within reflective knowledge, we distinguish simple knowl-
edge and complex knowledge. We were able to integrate Sosa’s epistemic
perspective in our simple knowledge and we were able to integrate Za-
gzebski’s virtues in our complex knowledge. No doubt Zagzebskian virtues
do play an important role in acquiring complex knowledge and eventually,
in acquiring wisdom. Indeed, it is a sort of knowledge which we all aspire
to have.
It is worth noting that unreflective knowledge is said to be high on
certainty as a result of the conformity between reality and what is grasped
by our sensory faculties about the reality. Our sensory faculties do not play
tricks on us. They provide us information accordingly based on their prop-
er object. Nonetheless, since sensory faculties do not «know» such con-
formity, unreflective knowledge is low on cognitive value. Zagzebski com-
ments:
«Compared to the high-grade beliefs in the sciences, philosophy, or the
acts, the best perceptual beliefs are generally regarded as high on the scale
of certainty, even if low on the scale of cognitive value»293.
Accordingly, reflective knowledge will be high on cognitive value
mainly because it underlines the active role of the epistemic agent. That
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not only does the agent know the conformity between the knowing facul-
ties and the sensible thing, but it also emphasizes the personal effort of the
epistemic agent in his epistemic inquiry most especially if we are consid-
ering complex knowledge. As stated, the agent has to employ his intellec-
tual virtues and if complemented with Zagzebskian virtues, he will be in a
better position to acquire knowledge of the highest degree. Hence, Sosa
does have a point in saying that «we humans, especially those of us who
are philosophical or at least reflective, aspire to higher knowledge»294. We
could say that our aspiration to a higher knowledge is in accord with our
goal to happiness295. To echo the words of Aristotle, we are beings who
will always desire to know since what lies beyond knowledge is eudaimo-
nia296.
3. CONCLUSIONS
The definition of knowledge as JTB dates back from Plato’s
Theaetetus, according to which knowledge was considered as true belief
with an account. This means that a true belief must be supported by rea-
sons in order to qualify as knowledge. Thus, what has become to be the
common understanding of justification was to provide argumentative rea-
sons in favor of a belief to justify it. Sosa criticizes this way of looking at
justification because of vicious circularity. He believes that the justifica-
tion of beliefs is possible without argumentative reasons. Sosa suggests
the doctrine of supervenience, a thesis that maintains that evaluative prop-
erties must supervene on non-evaluative properties. A belief then is justi-
fied in virtue of its non-evaluative properties such as perception, or mem-
ory, or from any reliable cognitive faculty. Sosa proposes an account of
justification based on cognitive faculties and epistemic perspectivism.
Hence, an apt belief derives from the exercise of one’s cognitive faculties
while a justified belief derives from the epistemic perspective of the sub-
ject.
Aptness explains the positive epistemic status of perceptual beliefs.
It provides us with a way to explain how beliefs acquired by small children
and animals can have the positive epistemic status they deserve. Sosa’s
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294. E. SOSA, «Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology», p. 108.
295. «The classical idea was that eudaimonia involves the fulfillment of human na-
ture, and knowledge is at least part of such a fulfillment, perhaps, the most important
part». L. ZAGZEBSKI, Virtues of the Mind, p. 198. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics,
X, 7, 1177a 7-21.
296. «Según Aristóteles, la felicidad está en el conocimiento. Ser feliz es conocer,
pues la felicidad es la posesión del fin». L. POLO, Curso de teoría del conocimiento, I,
EUNSA, Pamplona 32006, pp. 214-215.
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justification, in turn, explains those beliefs acquired by mature adult per-
sons via epistemic perspectivism. However, we think that justification
should not only differ from aptness in terms of epistemic perspectivism.
The distinction between aptness and justification necessitates the distinc-
tion between cognitive faculties and intellectual virtues. If we consider the
difference between a child’s beliefs from an adult’s beliefs, we think that
the need for distinguishing faculties from virtues justifies itself.
A child does not possess intellectual virtues. The beliefs she ac-
quires can only be explained via cognitive faculties, which are naturally
endowed powers. On the other hand, an adult’s beliefs are acquired
through the exercise of her intellectual virtues. The reliability of her cog-
nitive faculties is just a consequence of its virtuous use. Again, we re-
main convinced that providing a distinction between faculties and virtues
will provide a better account of justification, which unfortunately is lack-
ing in Sosa’s Virtue Perspectivism. We conclude that our distinction of
cognitive faculties and intellectual virtues must be incorporated in our
distinction of aptness and justification. The use of cognitive faculties will
provide aptness and the use of our intellectual virtues will provide justifi-
cation.
We grant Sosa for his distinction of animal knowledge and reflec-
tive knowledge. Knowledge does admit different degrees in epistemic
quality among the epistemic agents. To acknowledge such differences, we
admitted that our account of knowledge must accommodate both the low-
end and the high-end state of knowledge. In accord with Sosa, we referred
to these two sorts of knowledge as unreflective and reflective knowledge.
Note that our distinction of knowledge reflects the passivity and the activ-
ity of the epistemic agent in the acquisition of knowledge and it calls at-
tention to the important role of the reasoning faculty in knowledge. Fur-
thermore, it helps us to identify the parallelism between our unreflective
and reflective knowledge to that of sensible and intellectual knowledge,
understood in the classical sense. Such parallelism helps to underline the
continuity between our two sorts of knowledge –unreflective and reflec-
tive–. The distinction of knowledge does not admit separation, but conti-
nuity in the knowing subject. In short, within the gamut of the different
degrees of knowledge, all pertain to what we consider as human knowl-
edge.
The descriptions we provided for both sort of knowledge fit nicely
with our distinction of cognitive faculties and intellectual virtues. Unre-
flective knowledge is true belief out of cognitive faculties and reflective
knowledge is true belief out of intellectual virtues. Within the field of re-
flective knowledge, we also distinguished simple knowledge and complex
knowledge to account for the difference in epistemic status that the cogni-
tive agent may have within the arena of reflection. Hence, we were able to
A NEW APPROACH TO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IN SOSA’S VIRTUE... 201
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 201
integrate both the positive insights of Sosa and Zagzebski’s account in our
proposed theory. We argued that it is essential that we admit an anthropo-
logical conception of knowledge; hence, we are forced to consider other
factors, which may also influence the knower in his acquisition of reflec-
tive knowledge, such as education, religion, family, community, etc. We
think that our proposed account provides a more complete explication of
human knowledge.
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